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I. INTRODUCTION
In February 1982, the Cuban Council of State approved legis-
lation which authorized foreign investment on the island in the
form of joint ventures.1 For the first several years after enactment,
the joint venture law generated scattered interest from prospective
investors, but very few investments materialized.
2
The Cuban government became more active in promoting for-
eign joint ventures in the mid-1980s. In 1987, the Cuban Govern-
ment created Cubanacfin expressly for the purpose of developing
1. Resoluci6n sobre el desarrollo econ6mico, GRANMA, Oct. 17, 1991, at 3 (Cuba). All
subsequent citations in this Article to Spanish language documents are of Cuban origin un-
less otherwise indicated. All translations are by the author unless otherwise noted.
2. See, e.g., JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, To MAKE A WORLD SAFE FOR REVOLUTION: CUBA'S FOR-
EIGN POLICY 211 (1989) (reporting that as of early 1985 only one joint venture, between
Cuban and Spanish interests to recycle metal products, had materialized); Jeremy Main,
Castro Tightens Cuba's Belt, FORTUNE, Sept. 16, 1985, at 120, 128-29 (reporting that as of
1985 not a single joint venture had resulted).
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the international tourism industry through joint ventures.3 From
that point forward, Cuba's promotion of joint ventures has focused
on tourism. The first sizable joint venture was between Cubanacin
and the Spanish hotel chain Grupo Sol in late 1987. This venture
led to the construction of the Sol Palmeras Hotel in Varadero
Beach which was inaugurated in May 1990."
In the late 1980s, mired in a recession and faced with deterio-
rating trade and foreign assistance relations with Eastern Europe
and the then Soviet Union, Cuba assigned an even higher priority
to establishing joint ventures. The Cuban government began a very
aggressive campaign to attract foreign investment from Western
countries to develop the island's international tourism industry. To
support this effort, the Cuban Council of State enacted a special
labor relations law in 1990 that applies exclusively to international
tourist facilities.5 When the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Com-
munist Party approved economic regulations to implement this
special labor regime in October 1991,6 it legitimized the drive to
attract foreign investment and recognized foreign investment as
one of the keys to Cuba's economic strategy for the 1990s. Accord-
ing to Cuban officials, by mid-1992, Cuba had concluded sixty joint
ventures with foreign investors, and one hundred more were under
discussion.7 The most significant of these investments were related
to tourism.
This Article describes the special labor regime applicable to
international tourist installations in Cuba. Part II briefly describes
the legal framework for joint ventures in Cuba and analyzes some
of the key provisions. Part III provides background on the Cuban
tourism industry. Part IV describes the labor relations system ap-
plicable to the international tourism system, and Part V compares
3. Cuba, the Gulf and the Superpowers, CUBA Bus,, Dec. 1990, at 1, 11. Cubanac6n is
an enterprise of the Cuban government responsible for developing the international tourism
industry. Cubanacln is often the Cuban party to a foreign joint venture. Cuba's national
Tourism Institute ("INTUR"), Cubanacdn, and a third government enterprise, Gaviota, re-
portedly engage in "fraternal competition" in attracting foreign tourists. DONNA RICH
KAPLOWITZ & MICHAEL KAPLOwITz, NEw OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S.-CUBAN TRADE 21 (1992).
4. Sol-Palmeras Manager on Hotel Operations, FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SER-
vicE, LATIN AMERICAN REPORT [FBIS-LAT], July 11, 1991, at 5, 7.
5. Sobre regulaciones laborales especiales para los trabajadores del Sistema de Turismo
Internacional [On Special Labor Regulations for International Tourism Workers], Decree
No. 122, GACETA OFICIAL, Aug. 13, 1990, at 27 [hereinafter Decree No. 122].
6. These regulations will be discussed in detail infro.
7. Pedro Sevcec, Castro firme en su negativa a apertura, EL NUEVO HERALD (Miami),
June 11, 1992, at 1A, 5A (quoting Cuban National Bank President H~ctor Rodriguez).
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this special regime with the one applicable to all Cuban workers.
Part VI discusses Cuba's experience to date with the implementa-
tion of the special regime for workers in the international tourism
industry. This Article concludes with some observations regarding
the legal framework for joint ventures in Cuba and the special
rules developed to attract foreign investment in the international
tourism industry.
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF CUBAN JOINT VENTURES: DECREE
No. 50
The Council of State (Consejo de Estado)s enacted Decree No.
50, "On Economic Association Between Cuban and Foreign Enti-
ties," and on February 15, 1982 Fidel Castro, in his capacity as
President of the Council, signed it into law.9 On September 15,
1982, the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Cuba (Ctimara
de Comercio de la Rephblica de Cuba), the State Committee on
Finance (Cornitt Estatal de Finanzas, "CEF"), the General Cus-tomsq T)PnnrtmP.nt (iroer;A (1onorrl 4to Afy,- +I,- -ak .h lT
t~~~~~mR~~~ Thpatnin _Dr~~~ Genra de __uJ, the Cuban N1-
tional Bank (Banco Nacional de Cuba, "BNC"), the State Com-
mittee on Prices (ComitO Estatal de Precios, "CEP"), and the
State Committee on Labor and Social Security (Comit6 Estatal de
Trabajo y Seguridad Social, "CETSS") issued the first set of im-
plementing regulations. 10
Decree No. 50 is very brief, covering about five pages in the
Gaceta Oficial. Its five chapters deal with general, financial, tax,
commercial, and labor provisions. A preamble gives the rationale
behind the law, and a concluding section addresses miscellaneous
matters. This Article analyzes Cuba's legal framework for joint
ventures by examining the official texts of the laws and regula-
8. DOMINGo GARCfA CARDENAS, STATE ORGANIZATION IN CUBA 56-59 (1986). The Council
of State represents the National Assembly of People's Power, the highest organ of state
power in the country, when the Assembly is not in session. The Council of State is com-
posed of a president, a first vice-president, five vice-presidents, a secretary, and twenty-one
other members elected from within the National Assembly. Issuing law decrees when the
National Assembly is not in session is among the most important powers of the Council of
State. The President of the Council of State is both the head of government and the head of
state. Id.
9. Sobre asociaci6n econ6mica entre entidades Cubanas y extranjeras [On Economic
Association Between Cuban and Foreign Entities], Decree No. 50, GACETA OFICIAL, Feb. 15,
1982, at 11, translated in Cuba: Legislative Decree on Economic Association Between Cu-
ban and Foreign Entities, 21 I.L.M 1106 (1982) [hereinafter Cuban Joint Venture Law].
10. These are composed of nine regulations which will be discussed infra part IV.
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tions, promotional materials prepared by agencies of the Cuban
government," and published analyses of the legislation."2
In its drive to attract investment, Cuba has applied Decree
No. 50 very flexibly, negotiating aggressively with prospective for-
eign investors on a case-by-case basis. According to one foreign in-
vestor, the Cuban Government often negotiates deals that are more
liberal than those envisioned by the Council of State when it
passed the legislation: "[Tlhey have a joint venture law that is
published and is open knowledge, but the government will do
whatever it chooses. . . .What they're willing to give depends a
lot on what the overseas partner brings to the deal."' 3
The mid-July 1992 session of the National Assembly of Peo-
ple's Power (Asamblea Nacional del Poder Popular, "ANPP")
made three important changes to the 1976 Constitution." The
changes were designed to reassure foreign investors of their rights
by clarifying the role of private property and the ability of joint
ventures to engage in international trade.
Article 14 of the Constitution, which stated that the Cuban
economic system was based on public ownership of all the means
of production,'" was modified to introduce the concept of public
ownership of only the fundamental means of production.'" Accord-
ing to the ANPP Secretary, "fundamental means of production"
refers only to social property," implying some private ownership is
permitted.
11. E.g., CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VEN-
TURES IN CUBA (1982)[hereinafter POssmILITY OF JOINT VENTURES 1982]; EXECUTIVE CoMMrr-
TEE OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA, POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURES
IN CUBA (1991)[hereinafter POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURES 1991].
12. See generally JORGE F. PtREZ-L&PEZ, THE 1982 CUBAN JOINT VENTURE LAW: CON-
TEXT, ASSESSMENT, AND PROSPECTS (1985); Sula Fiszman, Foreign Investment Law: Encour-
agement Versus Restraint-Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean Basin Initiative, 8 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 147 (1985); Lynn McGilvray-Saltzman, Cuba's Joint Venture As-
sociations; Cuba Reopens Its Doors to Foreign Investment, 1 FLA. INT'L L.J. 45 (1984); Pat-
rick L. Schmidt, Foreign Investment in Cuba: A Preliminary Analysis, 15 LAW & POL'Y
INT'L Bus. 689 (1983); Jean G. Zorn & Harold Mayerson, Cuba's Joint Venture Law: New
Rules for Foreign Investment, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 273 (1983).
13. SANTIAGO FITTIPALDI, DEVELOPING BUSINESS STRATEGIES FOR CUBA 64 (1992) (quoting
John Issa, Chairman of Jamaica's Super Clubs Resorts).
14. See CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE CUBA [CUBAN CONST.] (1976). For a discus-
sion of the 1976 Constitution, see FERNANDO ALVAREZ TABfO, COMENTARIOS A LA CONSTITU-
CI6N SOCIALISTA (1981).
15. CUBAN CONST. art. 14 (1976).
16. CUBAN CONST. art. 14, reprinted in GRANMA, Sept. 22, 1992, at 3, 5.
17. Panel Discusses Changes to Constitution, FBIS-LAT, July 23, 1992, at 2 (quoting
ANPP Secretary Ernesto Suhrez).
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Cuba also modified Article 15 of its Constitution to eliminate
the concept of "irreversible" socialist ownership of the means of
production. The revised Article 1518 provides that socialist owner-
ship of real property can only be transferred to persons or corpora-
tions for the economic and social development of the country and
only with the prior approval of the Council of Ministers or. its Ex-
ecutive Committee."9
Additionally, a new article was added to the Constitution. Ar-
ticle 23 provides: "The state recognizes the ownership of mixed en-
terprises, economic societies, and associations that are created ac-
cording to the law. The use, benefit, and sale of assets belonging to




The stated purpose of Decree 50 is to promote economic de-
velopment by forming economic associations between Cuban and
foreign interests. 1 The law seems to target manufacturing plants,
tourism operations, and similar associations that can have a
favorable impact on Cuba's hard currency balance.2 2 The preamble
recognizes that in the past the Cuban government established and
successfully operated for-profit joint ventures abroad, combining
both Cuban and foreign capital." Further, it notes that "[c]ertain
forms of economic associations with foreign interests have also
been initiated within Cuban national territory in recent years,
18. CUBAN CONST. art. 15, reprinted in GRANMA, Sept. 22, 1992, at 3, 5; see also Amend-
ments to Cuban Constitution Compared, FBIS-LAT, July 24, 1992, at 3, 4.
19. CUBAN CONST. art. 15, reprinted in GRANMA, Sept. 22, 1992, at 3, 5. The Council of
Ministers is the highest-ranking executive and administrative organ of the Cuban Republic.
It is composed of a president, a first vice-president, vice-presidents, the chairperson of the
Central Planning Board, the chairpersons of the State Committees, the president of the
Cuban National Bank, the ministers, and the Secretary of the Council. The Executive Com-
mittee of the Council of Ministers substitutes for the Council when the latter is not in ses-
sion, and it has the authority, when the urgency of a case requires it, to decide matters
normally under the jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers. The Executive Committee of
the Council of Ministers is composed of the President of the Council, the first vice-presi-
dent, and other vice-presidents. See GARCIA CARDENAS, supro note 8, at 59-63.
20. CUBAN CONST. art. 23, reprinted in, GRANMA, Sept. 22, 1992, at 5.
21. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, pmbl., 21 I.L.M. at 1107.
22. Maria Elena Gil, A la b(squeda de nuevos mercados, CUBA INTERNACIONAL, June
1991, at 42.
23. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, pmbl., 21 I.L.M. at 1107.
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without having been specifically regulated by law." 4 However, as
the economic development of the nation requires joint ventures
within Cuba itself, particularly in areas where Cuba lacks sufficient
financial resources, raw materials, markets, or technology to permit
full utilization of Cuba's natural and human resources, the Council
of State has deemed it desirable to set forth a legal framework to
regulate the operation of such joint ventures.
The preamble provides that joint ventures are to operate inde-
pendently of the state, but fully within the confines of Cuban do-
mestic and international economic policies, particularly those poli-
cies that assign a high priority to export promotion and to the
development of international tourism.
25
B. General Provisions
The decree authorizes joint ventures between Cuban entities
and foreign interests for the specific purpose of promoting Cuba's
economic development through profit-making activities. Joint ven-
tures may take the form of either corporations (called "joint enter-
prises") or partnerships.2 The domestic investor may consist of in-
dividual state enterprises or groups of state enterprises, while the
foreign investors may be individuals as well as privately or publicly
owned firms.1
7
The law vests the power to review and authorize the establish-
ment of joint ventures in a high-level commission appointed by the
24. Id. Zorn and Mayerson note the following:
Some joint ventures between Cuban state enterprises and foreign investors, in-
cluding corporations and other privately owned entities, already were being ne-
gotiated or were in existence when the law was enacted, and Cuban authorities
had been informed by potential joint venture partners that legislation delimiting
the powers and obligations of joint venture participants would increase investor
interest.
Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 12, at 283. According to a visitor to Cuba, in January 1983
"some 24 foreign companies [were] already registered in Cuba, primarily for trading opera-
tions, and a few [had] contracts with Cuban enterprises for last-stage processing (of textiles
into garments, for example) of imported materials that are then re-exported." See Stephen
Zorn, Cuba's Cautious Moves to Attract Investment, 4 MULTINAT'L MONITOR 19, 20 (1983).
25. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, pmbl., 21 I.L.M. at 1107.
26. The law draws some minor distinctions between corporations and partnerships with
regard to the form of contribution that the Cuban partner can make and the degree of
participation a foreign partner is allowed. See Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 12, at 287-88.
Henceforth, this discussion deals with corporate joint ventures rather than partnerships.
27. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 5, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
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Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers.28 The commis-
sion consists of members and staff of the Executive Committee of
the Council of State and also legal specialists and economists from
the Cuban National Bank and other planning agencies.29 The com-
mission must give its decision to accept or deny a joint venture
proposal within two months after receiving it.30 In practice, how-
ever, decisions are sometimes delayed well beyond the statutory
time limit, creating some uncertainty for prospective foreign
investors."'
The commission is empowered to assist in the formation of
joint ventures. It can direct state, enterprises to lease land and fa-
cilities to joint ventures, and likewise, the commission can author-
ize the use of state-owned lands, industrial plants, and tourist fa-
cilities.32 Although the law appears to apply equally to both
existing and future facilities, Cuba's preference, outside of tourism,
appears to be for the former.33
Prospective partners jointly draft a memorandum of associa-
tion and "statutes" governing their joint venture's establishment
and operation. Thpsi,. in.triimpnts relineate th 1 on; hi; 11
tween the partners, as well as the procedures for managing the en-
terprise. Once adopted, only a mutual agreement of the parties can
serve to modify the memorandum of association and the statutes.3 4
The memorandum of association contains the parties' basic
understanding of management strategy for the joint venture. It
28. Id. art. 1, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
29. Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 12, at 300-01.
30. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 17, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
31. For example, Italcable's negotiations with Cuba to establish a joint venture to pro-
vide international telephone service were much delayed. Although a preliminary joint ven-
ture agreement was signed in late 1991, Italcable had not received a legally executed con-
tract as of April 1992. See Mr. Castro Goes to Market, Bus. WK., Apr. 20, 1992, at 46, 47.
32. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 2, 21 I.L.M. at 1107.
33. In the early 1980s, Cuba reportedly sought foreign participation in eight factories
that it had previously purchased from Japanese and European suppliers in the 1970s. The
plants were operating at less than full capacity as a result of shortages in raw materials and
a lack of export markets. Thus, Cuba needed foreign investors to provide raw materials,
export markets, improved technology and management-all with the aim of increasing ex-
port-oriented output. The factories considered for joint ventures included: 1) a pharmaceu-
tical-products plant located outside Havana with the capacity to produce 80 million penicil-
lin capsules per year (compared to domestic demand of 10 million capsules per year); 2) an
automobile battery plant located in Manzanillo; 3) a cable and wire factory located outside
Havana; 4) cereal enterprises located in Santiago de Cuba and CArdenas; and 5) a plant that
manufactures particle-board from sugar cane waste located in Ciego de Avila. See Zorn,
supra note 24, at 19-20.
34. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 11, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
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must contain provisions that guarantee management or co-manage-
ment of the joint venture by the Cuban partner, as well as explicit
commitments that each partner will sell the goods or services pro-
duced. The requirement of a Cuban manager or co-manager seems
to run contrary to Cuba's promise of the autonomy made to inves-
tors in promotional materials and contrary to statements made by
Cuban officials."
The statutes contain the rules governing the organization and
operation of the joint venture. They include provisions for:36
1) regulating the structure, attributions, and procedures of
stockholders' meetings;
2) establishing voting procedures;
3) setting forth the structure and duties of the board of
directors; and
4) establishing procedures on a wide range of issues such
as appointment, compensation and duties of managers; ac-
counting rules; computation and distribution of profits;
settlement of disputes between partners; and termination
of joint ventures and liquidation of assets.
Although the law is quite flexible and allows for negotiation
between the partners on many issues related to the establishment
and operation of joint ventures, there are certain non-negotiable
conditions. Joint ventures established under Decree No. 50 must
be domiciled in Cuba, temporary in duration, and subject to the
same regulations that apply to domestic corporations.3
With regard to duration, the legislation is vague. While it pro-
vides that joint ventures must be temporary, it states that the du-
ration of individual joint ventures may vary from case to case, de-
pending on the length of time the venture will require to amortize
capital expenditures and to obtain an acceptable level of profit.3 8
Presumably, the duration of each joint venture is negotiated be-
tween the prospective investor and the Cuban state. While the
vagueness of article 4 on the duration of joint ventures allows a
great deal of flexibility, it also concerns potential investors, partic-
ularly when substantial capital investments are involved.
35. POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURES 1982, supra note 11, at 2; see also, Cuban Joint
Venture Law, supra note 9, 21 I.L.M. at 1106 (introductory note).
36. See Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 8, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
37. Id. arts. 6-7, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
38. Id. art. 4, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
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Although joint ventures must be domiciled in Cuba, they may
establish foreign offices or subsidiaries, and they may hold finan-
cial interests in entities operating abroad. Joint ventures are sub-
ject to Cuba's commercial code and to other commercial regula-
tions that apply to domestic corporations."9
Joint ventures acquire legal status once they are recorded in a
special registry maintained by the Chamber of Commerce of the
Republic of Cuba.'0 On September 15, 1982, the Chamber of Com-
merce issued regulations creating the registry; setting forth the re-
gistration procedures; and establishing a schedule of fees for re-
cording the formation, modification or termination of joint
ventures, and for the issuance of certificates of registration."'
C. Financial Provisions
Partners in a joint venture may contribute cash or assets.
42
Contributions by the Cuban partner may include the temporary
use of land, buildings, or structures. Partners may also contribute
raw materials, tools, and equipment. The law requires that all con-
tributions be valued in hard currency.43 Assets contributed by the
Cuban partner are valued first in domestic currency and then con-
verted to hard currency at the official exchange rate." Because
Cuba's official exchange rate for converting from domestic to hard
currency is highly overvalued, 6 contributions made by foreign
partners in hard currency are understated.
The Cuban Joint Venture Law limits foreign ownership to
49% of the assets of the joint venture, but a partner may exceed
this limit if authorized by the Executive Committee of the Council
39. Id. art. 6, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
40. Id. art. 10, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
41. Resolution No. 6-82 of the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Cuba, GACETA
OFICIAL, Oct. 1, 1982, at 214.
42. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 14, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
43. Id.
44. Since 1961, the Cuban peso has not been freely exchanged in international markets.
The official exchange rate of the peso vis-a-vis the dollar significantly overestimates the
purchasing power of the former, but reliable estimates of the extent of overvaluation do not
exist. See, e.g., CARMELO MESA-LAGO & JORGE PPREz-L6PEZ, A STUDY OF CUBA'S MATERIAL
PRODUCT SYSTEM, ITS CONVERSION TO THE SYSTEM OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS, AND ESTIMATION
OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT PER CAPITA AND GROWTH RATES (1985). The official peso-U.S.
dollar exchange rate (in U.S. dollars per Cuban peso) was: in 1982, $1.20; in 1983, $1.16; in
1984, $1.13; in 1985, $1.09; in 1986, $1.21; and in 1987-92, $1.00. See BANCO NACIONAL DE
CUBA-CoMITt ESTATAL DE ESTADISTICAS, CUBA: INFORME ECON6MICO TRIMESTRAL 21 (1983).
45. See infra note 56 and accompanying text.
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of Ministers." Available information suggests that the Executive
Committee routinely authorizes foreign participation exceeding
49% in tourism joint ventures. 47 Additionally, Cuban officials have
stated that Cuba is likely to consider majority ownership in joint
ventures in priority areas like tourism.4" At the 1991 Ibero-Ameri-
can Summit in Guadalajara, President Castro announced that
Cuba would consider granting "preferential treatment" to incom-
ing capital from Latin America,'9 presumably including 100%
ownership.
During the application process for a joint venture, the com-
mission that approves the establishment of joint ventures may re-
quire a prospective foreign partner to post a bond, in the form of
cash or securities, guaranteeing that the investment, if approved,
will be consummated."' If the joint venture is approved, cash
bonds are applied toward the contribution of the foreign partner or
returned. Should a proposed joint venture be disapproved, the
bond is returned. 1
Joint ventures must carry insurance on all facilities contrib-
uted by Cuban enterprises, and the policy must make the Cuban
partner the primary beneficiary.52 The State Finance Committee
also requires coverage against losses from fire, hurricanes, wind
storms, flooding, and earthquakes."2 Consistent with providing for
Cuba's economic development, Cuban insurance companies have
the first option to underwrite the coverage, though the insurance
companies must meet internationally competitive terms. 4
Joint ventures must conduct their financial transactions in
hard currency, using special hard-currency accounts established in
46. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 15, 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
47. Howard W. French, Cuba Flirts with Capitalism to Avoid Collapse, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 1990, at A18.
48. Id. Cuban Chamber of Commerce President Julio Garcia Olivera told journalists in
January 1991 that Cuba "would not reject offers from foreign capitalists to make up to 100
percent investment in enterprises on the island." Chamber of Commerce Invites Foreign
Investment, FBIS-LAT, Jan. 10, 1991, at 3; see also Gil, supra note 22, at 40, 42.
49. FIDEL CASTRO, INDEPENDIENTES HASTA SIEMPRE 50 (1991).
50. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 16, 21 I.L.M. at 1108. Cash bonds
draw interest at the prevailing rate of interest. Id.
51. Id. art. 17(a), 21 I.L.M. at 1108.
52. Id. art. 18, 21 I.L.M. at 1108-09.
53. Resolution No. 54-82 of the State Finance Committee, GACErA OFICIAL, Oct. 1, 1982,
at 207.
54. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 32, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
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Cuban banks.50 Inputs purchased domestically (raw materials, in-
termediate inputs, labor services), as well as taxes due the Cuban
state, must be paid in hard currency, using the official Cuban ex-
change rate. In July 1989, the Cuban National Bank set the official
peso-U.S. dollar exchange rate for operations of joint ventures'at
1:1, with the exchange rates of all other hard currencies to be de-
rived from cross-rates of exchange of the U.S. dollar in New
York. a
Joint ventures may borrow funds, in hard currency, from for-
eign or national banks. Loans from domestic institutions will nor-
mally be short-term (maturity of one year or less), fully guaranteed
by assets of the joint venture, and carry interest rates competitive
with those prevailing in international markets. The Cuban govern-
ment prohibits domestic institutions from making loans to cover
any part of the foreign partner's initial contribution to joint ven-
tures and from making loans denominated in U.S. dollars as long
as the U.S. Treasury Department regulations restricting the use of
U.S. currency in Cuba remain in effect. 7
The Cuban legislation provides few financial incentives. There
are no provisions for loans to promote the establishment of joint
ventures and only a weak reference in the regulations to possible
preferential credits for existing joint ventures. As noted above, the
regulations issued by the Cuban National Bank expressly prohibit
loans to foreign investors for the purpose of establishing joint ven-
tures. Though ongoing joint ventures may obtain credit from the
domestic banking system, such credit normally will be restricted to
working capital and will carry maturities of one year or less. Ongo-
ing ventures may also request longer-term credit from the Cuban
National Bank to finance specific investment projects; if approved,
55. Id. art. 19, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
56. Resolution No. 299 of the Cuban National Bank, GACETA OFICIAL, Aug. 26, 1989, at
814; see also, Resolution No. 77 of the Cuban National Bank, GACETA OFICIAL, May 29, 1991,
at 207. This official rate contrasts with a current "black market" rate of about 10 pesos to
the U.S. dollar. However, this estimate is highly speculative. See CARLO GEBLER, DRIVING
THROUGH CUBA 38-43 (1988) (Gebler was approached by several individuals during his 1987
visit to Cuba who offered to exchange Cuban pesos for U.S. dollars at the rate of 5:1); Juan
Jesfis Aznarez, Funciona un activo mercado negro de d6lares en La Habana, DIAmO LAS
AM.RICAS, Oct. 24, 1987, at Al, A15 (stating that the "black market" exchange rate was 6:1
in fall 1987); ANDRS OPPENHEIMER, CASTRO'S FINAL HOUR 152 (1992) (estimating the black
market exchange rate was 10:1).
57. Resolution No. 660 of the Cuban National Bank, GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 1, 1982, at
212. The U.S. regulations referred to are the Cuban Assets Control Regulations of the U.S.
Treasury Department, appearing in 31 C.F.R. Part 515 (1981).
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a loan will be extended at the prevailing international market
rate.5 8 The regulations provide that the Cuban National Bank
"might study" granting credits at preferential terms to existing
joint ventures, consistent with practices in other nations,59 but
neither the law nor the regulations define the circumstances under
which preferential credits will be available.
Joint ventures must also create a reserve fund to cover contin-
gencies80 The State Finance Committee requires a joint venture to
contribute annually 5% of its operating profit to the reserve fund,
until the fund reaches a certain percentage of the capital of the
joint venture (set at 15% for joint ventures in manufacturing and
20% for those in service activities). These funds can only be used
to cover losses from extraordinary circumstances, and any with-
drawals must be replenished through annual contributions
amounting to 10% of operating profits.a1
The Cuban government "guarantees" foreign partners the un-
restricted right to remit abroad, in hard currency, their share of
profits and dividends earned by a joint venture, as well as the pro-
ceeds from the liquidation of a joint venture.8 " However, if the
joint venture suspends its activities as a result of unilateral action
by the Cuban government, the statute merely states that the Cu-
ban National Bank "may guarantee" foreign investors the ability
to repatriate liquidation proceeds.
63
The vagueness of the repatriation guarantee for liquidation
proceeds is one of the major flaws in the joint venture statute. For
business executives considering investing in Cuba, investment pro-
tection is a more sensitive issue than it would be elsewhere as a
result of two factors: 1) Cuba is a socialist state with a jaundiced
view toward private property, despite the 1992 changes to the Con-
stitution; and 2) Cuba has a poor record in compensating foreign
investors for previous instances of nationalization. 4 The statutory
guarantee of remittance falls considerably short of providing the
level of investment guarantees that foreign parties typically de-
58. Resolution No. 660, supra note 57, at 212.
59. Id.
60. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 22, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
61. Resolution No. 53-82 of the State Finance Committee, GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 1, 1982,
at 207.
62. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 23, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
63. Id. art 24.
64. See Jorge F. P~rez-Lpez, The Economics of Cuban Joint Ventures, 16 CUBAN
STUDIES 181, 185 (1986).
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mand.6 Moreover, issues of expropriation and compensation have
already surfaced with respect to joint ventures under Decree 50."
The legislation also limits the ability of foreign executives and
technicians employed by joint ventures to remit abroad. Such em-
ployees may remit only a certain percentage of their compensation
in hard currency. The Cuban National Bank has issued regulations
initially setting this percentage at 66%. s" Because this limit is not
part of the statute, it can be lowered, or raised, by future adminis-
trative action.
D. Tax Provisions
Income of joint ventures, shareholders' dividends, and income
of joint venture executives are exempt from Cuba's general system
of taxation."s Instead, the following taxes and levies, payable in
hard currency, are applicable:
1) a 30% tax on net profit payable annually within the
lirLt two i-ffosits fuowing the end of the calendar year;
2) a 25% payroll tax, levied on the total compensation (ex-
cluding payments from incentive funds) paid to Cuban
employees (this tax includes the employer's contributions
to social security);
3) import duties;
4) personal property taxes on automobiles; and
5) levies and fees generally associated with obtaining and
renewing certain legal documents." s
65. ERNESTO F. BETANCOURT, MEMORANDUM ON JOINT VENTURES IN CUBA (1983).
66. In late 1991 or early 1992, Cuba took over the very successful Havana Club dis-
cotheque, located at the Comodoro Hotel in Havana. The discotheque, which catered to an
international clientele, was a joint venture between the Cuban tourism enterprise Cubana-
cin (80 percent) and a Spanish investment group, Grupo Habana (20 percent). The majority
stockholder acquired the foreign ownership and changed the discotheque to attract to a
domestic clientele. The rationale for taking over the joint venture was to avoid social
problems; the discotheque appealed to Cuban youth. See Cuba interviene discoteca hecha
con capital espahol, DIARIO LAS AM19RICAS, Jan. 12, 1992, at 1A; Lee Hockstader, Cuba's
Glimmer of Glitter, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1991, at C9. The manager of the Spanish invest-
ment group, Jordi Escarrd, downplayed the broader implications of the joint venture's disso-
lution, noting that his group was adequately compensated. See Claribel Terre Morell, No me
siento un fracasado, BOHEMIA, Apr. 17, 1992, at 12.
67. Resolution No. 659 of the Cuban National Bank, GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 1, 1982, at
211.
68. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 25, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
69. Id.
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To implement this special taxation system, the State Finance
Committee issued regulations in the fall of 1982 defining gross in-
come, deductible expenditures (including depreciation schedules),
and net income.7 0 The Cuban depreciation schedules appear to be
less liberal than those of other nations. These depreciation sched-
ules appear to be deficient in two respects: 1) they utilize the
straight-line depreciation method and do not provide for acceler-
ated depreciation; and 2) the schedules provide for usable lives
that appear to far exceed actual usefulness.7 1 In 1983, Cuba estab-
lished faster depreciation schedules for buildings and structures
used by joint ventures in the international tourism industry; the
new schedules reflect the concerns expressed by the National
Tourism Institute (Instituto Nacional del Turismo, "INTUR")
that the normal depreciation schedules did not permit tourism in-
vestors to realize sufficient returns on their investments to justify
their association with Cuban partners.
72
On a case by case basis, the State Finance Committee may
temporarily exempt joint ventures from payment of income taxes
and import duties if the exemption is deemed to be "beneficial to
the nation. '73 Cuban authorities have not published their criteria
for determining when an investment is "beneficial to the nation."
Decree 50 is vague regarding any tax and import duty exemp-
tions (i.e. tax holidays) that might be granted to joint ventures.
The Cuban government has not established guidelines for deter-
mining the duration or extent of tax and import duty holidays. By
contrast, many competing countries statutorily grant tax and im-
port duty holidays according to published rules that objectively
measure an investment project's contribution to the nation's eco-
70. Resolution No. 52-82 of the State Finance Committee, GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 1, 1982,
at 203.
71. The depreciation schedule applicable to joint ventures is as follows: cement or brick
structures, 3 percent per annum (usable life of 33.3 years); wooden structures, 6 percent
(16.7 years); furniture, 10 percent (10 years); office equipment, except data processing equip-
ment, 15 percent (6.7 years); data processing equipment, 25 percent (4 years); road transpor-
tation equipment, 20 percent (5 years); sea transportation equipment, 6 percent (16.7 years);
air transportation equipment, 25 percent (4 years); tractors and other agricultural machin-
ery, 25 percent (4 years); construction machinery, 25 percent (4 years); agricultural equip-
ment, 15 percent (6.7 years); general machinery, 6 percent (16.7 years); and live animals, 15-
50 percent (2 to 6.7 years). See id. at 204-05.
72. Resolution No. 22/83 of the State Finance Committee, GACETA OFICIAL, June 22,
1983, at 612.
73. Resolution No. 52-82, supra note 70, art. 28.
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nomic development and international competitiveness. 74
This examination of the Cuban joint venture law suggests that
the array of investment incentives falls short of those offered by
other developing nations that actively seek foreign investment.
Though Cuba's nominal 30% tax rate on net profit is substantially
lower than the maximum tax rate of South American nations
(which averages about 50%), 71 Cuba's rate is not significantly dif-
ferent from those prevailing in other Caribbean nations."' More-
over, since net profit excludes depreciation and since Cuban depre-
ciation schedules are less liberal than those in other nations, it is
not evident that the relatively low tax rate in the Cuban law would
result in lower tax liability for joint ventures.
E. Commercial Provisions
The Cuban Joint Venture Law grants joint ventures the abil-
ity to directly export their output, and to directly import necessary
inputs," subject to certain general reporting requirements.7 8 Be-
cause this provision contradicted the principle of absolute state
monopoly over foreign trade embodied in Article 18 of the 1976
74. See, e.g., U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION, POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A NORTH AMERICAN
FREE TRADE AGREEMENT ON APPAREL INVESTMENT IN CBERA COUNTRIES 43, USITC Pub.
2541 (July 1992) (Report to the United States Trade Representative on Investigation No.
332-321). For instance, CBERA countries and Mexico provide liberal tax incentives for firms
operating in free-trade zones (FTZs)-special areas designated by the host government to
encourage export-oriented investment. These incentives include exemptions from income
taxes, import duties, and local sales taxes on production for export purposes. In addition,'
foreign firms operating in the FTZs in the CBERA countries and in maquiladoras in Mexico
are allowed unrestricted remittances of profits and repatriation of capital. Id.
75. Salvador Juncadella, The Foreign Investment Laws of Latin America: Present and
Future, 16 INT'L LAW. 463, 467 (1982). The maximum combined rates ranged from 68.5% in
Peru to 37% in Paraguay. Id. at 472.
76. For a brief analysis of investment incentives in this area, see U.S. INT'L TRADE COM-
MISSION, supra note 74, at 43. For a more detailed analysis, see RICARDO MONGE GONZALEZ &
JORGE CORRALES QUESADA, POLITICAS DE PROTECCI6N E INCENTIVOS A LA MANUFACTURA,
AGROINDUSTRIA Y ALGUNOS SECTORES AGRICOLAS EN COSTA RICA (1988).
Joint ventures may select their own accounting system so long as it is in line with gen-
erally accepted accounting standards. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 30, 21
I.L.M. at 1109. Financial statements must be submitted periodically to the State Finance
Committee and are subject to audit. Id. art. 29, 21 I.L.M. at 1109. In mid-1983, the State
Finance Committee issued regulations outlining the types of business and financial informa-
tion that joint ventures must submit to the Committee on a quarterly basis. Guideline No.
11/83 of the State Finance Committee, GACETA OFICIAL, June 23, 1983, at 630.
77. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 31, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
78. Resolution No. 1-82 of the General Customs Department, GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 1,
1982, at 212.
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Constitution,7 9 in July 1992, the ANPP modified Article 18 of the
Constitution to eliminate the state's monopoly over foreign trade
and to establish more clearly the right of joint ventures to engage
directly in foreign trade.80 In so doing, Cuba acknowledged both
the abolition of the state monopoly over foreign trade and the dis-
solution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the trade
organization of socialist states. Thus, Article 18 of the Cuban Con-
stitution, as revised, empowers state institutions to "identify the
natural or judicial persons with legal capacity to engage in export
and import operations, and to enter into commercial pacts."'"
Cuban state enterprises have the first option to purchase
goods produced by joint ventures when the goods are substitutes
for ones imported from nations with which Cuba does not have
payment agreements (i.e., countries from which Cuba purchases
goods for hard currency), provided the prices are internationally
competitive.8 2 However, since this provision operates without
prejudice to the provision that joint ventures may export directly,8"
the legislation favors export promotion over import substitution.'
Cuban state enterprises guarantee joint ventures basic utilities
and supplies, such as electricity, water, gas, telephone, telex, and
domestic transportation. Through December 31, 1983 these ser-
vices were offered at official domestic prices, as established by the
State Committee on Prices, 5 but it is not clear what prices have
been applicable since 1984.
Domestic enterprises have the first option to supply interna-
tionally-traded goods and services to joint ventures, but they must
offer the goods and services at internationally competitive terms.8 "
Thus, Cuban enterprises have priority in supplying joint ventures
with fuels, raw materials, tools, equipment, spare parts, consumer
goods, maritime transportation, and insurance services. When con-
79. See Henry Dahl, Socialist Law in the Americas: The Foreign Trade Point of View,
3 CONN. J. INT'L L. 273, 293 (1988).
80. Amendments to Cuban Constitution Compared, supra note 18, at 4. Thus, Article
18 has been changed from "Foreign trade is the exclusive function of the state" to "The
state directs and controls foreign trade." Id.
81. CUBAN CONST. art. 18, reprinted in GRANMA, Sept. 22, 1992, at 3, 5.
82. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 32, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
83. Id. art. 31, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
84. Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 12, at 292; Schmidt, supra note 12, at 700-01.
85. Resolution No. M-24/82 of the State Committee on Prices, GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 1,
1982, at 208 [hereinafter Resolution No. M-24/82].
86. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 32, 21 I.L.M. at 1109.
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tracting with joint ventures, state enterprises may lower the prices
from "official" domestic levels to meet foreign competition.
8 7
The right of state enterprises to be first suppliers creates the
potential for indirect takings or "creeping nationalization" by the
Cuban state. Indirect or creeping nationalization occurs when, in-
stead of using the power of eminent domain to take over a foreign
investment, the host country relies on its regulatory or police pow-
ers to accomplish the same objective.8 Because the host state can
harass the foreign investor to a point where the enterprise is un-
profitable, creeping nationalization is as important to potential in-
vestors as overt nationalization. The state can use this technique
to induce the foreign investor to abandon the enterprise or sell it
to the state at a reduced price. Host countries can exert pressure
on foreign entrepreneurs by manipulating provisions in mineral
concessions, prices, tax and credit policies, and the availability of
nontraded goods essential to the enterprises and controlled by the
state (for example, utilities such as electric power, water, and tele-
phone service). 9 To exert more subtle pressure, host countries can
take such actions as manipulating exchange control policies and
delaying the repair of roads leading to a foreign plant.9 0
Creeping nationalization may have affected construction of the
Cohiba Hotel in Havana, a joint venture between the Cuban tour-
ism enterprise Cubanacdn and the Spanish consortium Ibercusa.
The construction of the large hotel incurred several delays. Cuban
officials reportedly suspended the project, claiming that the Span-
ish partner failed to make payments for supplies.9 ' However, the
Spanish partners claimed that the construction delays were the re-
sult of the Cuban partners' failure to deliver supplies.2
Disputes between joint ventures and state enterprises or other
state organizations are settled in accordance with the Cuban arbi-
tration system. Settlements of disputes by the Cuban arbitration
system, rather than by a court in the investor's home country or by
an international arbitration body, concerns prospective investors,
since in such cases the Cuban government is both an arbitrator
87. Resolution No. M-24/82, supra note 85, at 208.
88. Burns H. Weston, Constructive Takings Under International Law: A Modest
Foray Into the Problem of Creeping Expropriation, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 111-112 (1975).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. FIrTrIs , supra note 13, at 65.
92. Id.
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and a party.9 3 Moreover, foreign parties are at a distinct disadvan-
tage in such cases because there is limited information available on
the application of arbitration rules and because lawyers from capi-
talist nations lack experience with the Cuban system.94 "Cuban
lawyers, through intense practice, are likely to be good arbitration
strategists,"9 but the non-Cuban lawyers who represent foreign in-
vestors are likely to have great difficulty winning arbitration deci-
sions due to their lack of familiarity with the procedures.
F. Labor Provisions
Joint ventures must employ Cuban workers, except in certain
management, technical, and highly-skilled positions which all part-
ners agree only foreign citizens can fill. Joint ventures, however, do
not employ Cuban workers directly. Instead, a Cuban entity hires
the workers and then contracts with the joint venture to provide
the workforce in return for a monthly fee, in hard currency, which
covers the workers' wages and benefits."'
The joint venture's inability to manage its local labor re-
sources adversely affects the operation's efficiency and is a continu-
ing source of conflict between the joint venture and the Cuban en-
tity supplying the labor.
Regulations issued by Cuba's State Committee on Labor and
Social Security grant to the management of joint ventures the right
to reject workers provided for newly established enterprises. 97
Though the joint venture managers can reject a new worker, it is
not clear what criteria or procedures the managers may use for
such decisions. For example, it is unclear whether managers can
test prospective workers or even interview them. It is clear, how-
ever, that managers cannot approve or disapprove of workers if the
93. Schmidt, supra note 12, at 706.
94. See Enrique Dahl & Alejandro M. Garro, Cuba's System of International Commer-
cial Arbitration: A Convergence of Soviet and Latin American Traditions, 15 LAW. Am. 441,
464 (1984) (noting that after more than eight years of hearing disputes involving joint ven-
tures, Cuba's Foreign Trade Arbitration Court has not published a single decision to illus-
trate its operation and procedures); see also Elpidio Prez-Sutrez, El arbitraje en las rela-
ciones econ6micas internacionales, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO, Jan.-Dec. 1978, at 225.
95. Dahl & Garro, supra note 94, at 466.
96. Resolution No. 1647 of the State Committee on Labor and Social Security, GACTA
OriclAL, Oct. 1, 1982, at 210-11 (defining the relationship between workers and the Cuban
entity which hires them, on the one hand, and between the hiring entity and the joint ven-
ture, on the other).
97. Id. at 210.
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joint venture takes over an existing enterprise. In such cases, the
worker seniority system remains in force."8
Another area of potential conflict between the joint venture
and the Cuban state relates to staffing levels and the ability to ad-
just those levels promptly to reflect changes in demand. Cuba
wants to maximize the number of domestic jobs. However, man-
agement's incentive lies in keeping the number of jobs low to re-
duce labor costs and increase the potential for profit In the negoti-
ation stage, the foreign partner may have sufficient bargaining
power to reject efforts by the Cuban government to overstaff the
joint venture. However, the joint venture likely has very little lev-
erage in discussions with the state entity regarding layoffs in re-
sponse to cyclical or secular declines in output. Joint ventures may
find that for all practical purposes, the labor force is fixed. This
means that labor costs are also fixed, and other things being equal,
the profitability of the joint venture will decline with lower de-
mand. Paradoxically, the management of joint ventures may find
that the inability to hire workers directly hinders its ability to re-
fect profitability.
Joint ventures must pay Cuban workers according to the offi-
cial wage scale, as established by the State Committee on Labor
and Social Security. 9 However, there is an exception for Cuban
managers, whose remuneration must be comparable to that re-
ceived by foreign management personnel."'0 Although joint ven-
tures must pay the domestic hiring entity in hard currency for the
workers' wages and benefits, the Cuban entity is responsible for
paying the Cuban workers in domestic currency.'0 '
There are also miscellaneous requirements imposed on joint
ventures. For example, joint ventures are subject to national legis-
lation regarding worker safety and health.'0 2 Joint ventures must
also establish an incentive fund for the benefit of their Cuban
workers.""
98. Id.
99. Tarifas de servicios aplicables a las asociaciones econ6micas [Wage Scale for Eco-
nomic Associations], GACETA OFICIAL, Oct. 1, 1982, at 209.
100. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, art. 41, 21 I.L.M. at 1110.
101. Id. art. 41, 21 I.L.M. at 1110. The Cuban entity is also responsible for wages and
benefits due workers who are separated from the joint venture. See id. art 40, 21 I.L.M. at
1110.
102. Id. art. 39, 21 I.L.M. at 1110.
103. Id. art. 42, 21 I.L.M. at 1110.
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Foreign personnel employed by joint ventures enjoy special
treatment. Though they are subject to normal immigration regula-
tions,' 0 foreign personnel receive temporary resident status and
can enter and exit the country freely to carry out their employ-
ment duties. 06 Similar to the treatment afforded foreign diplomats
and guests, foreign personnel are eligible for a range of special
privileges, including special housing and access to hard currency
stores.10
G. Special Provisions
Decree No. 50 creates an incentive package to attract tourism
investment in preferred geographic areas. The Law on the Protec-
tion of the Environment and the Rational Use of Natural Re-
sources 10 7 designates certain areas as suitable for the development
of foreign tourism and authorizes the Council of Ministers to es-
tablish special administrative regimes for those areas. 08 The first
special provision of Decree No. 50 provides that tourism joint ven-
tures established in these specially designated areas may be ex-
empt from all taxes and levies and may enjoy more favorable regu-
lations regarding labor, public order, and immigration controls. As
a further incentive, the second special provision provides that
these foreign partners may directly lease Cuban installations and
directly hire Cuban workers, subject to approval by the Executive
Committee of the Council of Ministers.' 9 The law also permits the
importation of foreign managers. '
The third special provision exempts joint ventures and their
foreign partners from the confidentiality rules which normally ap-
ply to all enterprises.'" This probably refers to the ban on disclos-
ure of military, political, economic, scientific, and technical infor-
mation which might compromise the security of the state." 2 In the
104. Id. art. 43, 21 I.L.M. at 1110.
105. POSSIBILITY OF JOINT VENTURES 1982, supra note 11, at 6.
106. Id.
107. De protecci6n del medio ambiente y del uso racional de los recursos naturales [On
Protection of the Environment and Rational Use of Natural Resources], Law 33 of Jan. 10,
1981, GACETA OFiciAL, Feb. 12, 1981, at 255.
108. Id.
109. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, special provision II, 21 I.L.M. at 1110.
110. Jon Glazer & Kurt Hollander, Working for the Tourist Dollar, THE NATION, June
15, 1992, at 820, 822 (noting that owners of joint ventures often seek German managers).
111. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, special provision III, 21 I.L.M. at 1110.
112. See, e.g., Ley del secreto estatal [Law on State Secrets], Law 1246 of May 14, 1973,
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absence of this exemption, foreign joint venture partners would
lack access to the basic economic data needed for analyzing the
feasibility of an enterprise or its performance over time.
Pursuant to the fourth special provision, Decree No. 50 does
not apply to those compensation arrangements through which
Cuba imports turn-key plants or other industrial facilities using
medium or long-term foreign credits which Cuba repays through
the sale of part, or all, of the facilities' output.11 Similarly, the law
does not apply to economic associations between Cuba and the
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ("CMEA") or a CMEA
nation, or between Cuba and the Latin American Economic Sys-
tem (Sistema Econ6mico Latinoamericano, "SELA"). 1 '
Finally, joint ventures must regularly submit statistical data
on their operations to the State Committee on Statistics for the
following areas: 1) financial and business transactions; 2) employ-
ment and labor force; and 3) depending on the specific activities of
the joint venture, imports, exports, and output of goods and
services.11
III. TOURISM AND THE CUBAN ECONOMY
Although the Cuban government promotes the establishment
of joint ventures in all industries, it has made special efforts, be-
ginning in the mid-1980s, to draw foreign investment to the inter-
national tourism industry. This focus on international tourism is
strategic for several reasons. First, Cuba's natural resources-a
warm climate with mean year-round temperature of 87 degrees
Fahrenheit and 289 beaches scattered along 3,570 miles of coast-
line"-make the island a prime destination for tourists who seek
sun-oriented vacations. Second, Cuba's focus acknowledges both
the current and prospective importance of international tourism in
the world economy. According to a recent study, the travel and
tourism industry is already the world's largest industry, generating
GACETA OFICIAL, May 17, 1973, at 33; Reglamento para la ejecuci6n de la ley del secreto
estatal [Regulations for the Enforcement of the Law on State Secrets], GACETA OFICIAL, Jan.
17, 1974, at 73. These regulations explicitly prohibit the disclosure of confidential economic
data to foreigners, presumably including actual or prospective joint venture partners.
113. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, special provision IV, 21 I.L.M. at 1111.
114. Id. special provision V, 21 I.L.M. 1111.
115. Resolution No. 96/83 of the State Committe on Statistics, GACE-.A OpiciAL, June
23, 1983, at 627.
116. Carmen de Oliveira, Turistroika?, CUBA INT'L, Jan. 1990, at 30.
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more than 5.5% of the global gross national product in 1989 and
employing more than 112 million people worldwide (1 in every 15
employees).117 In certain geographic regions, such as the Carib-
bean, Latin America, and the Pacific, the contributions of travel
and tourism to national economies is even higher." s Finally,
Cuba's emphasis on tourism reflects the reluctance of foreign in-
vestors to invest in other sectors of the economy.
International tourism was an important source of income and
employment in pre-revolutionary Cuba. In the 1950s, Cuba exper-
ienced a construction and renovation boom in the hotel industry.
Between 1950 and 1958, 28 new hotels and motels were built, and
11 others were under construction or in the design stage. 1 9 In
1958, over 335,000 foreign tourists visited Cuba, and the island
earned nearly $57 million from the international tourism
industry.'
Revolutionary Cuba eschewed international tourism partly be-
cause of ideological considerations, especially the concern that in-
ternational tourists with their capitalistic manners and vices would
contaminate Cuban socialism. Decree No. 50 reflects this concern
by encouraging the development of enclave tourist facilities, lo-
cated in small islands and keys physically separated from the Cu-
ban population. "By channelling tourists to these relatively iso-
lated areas, Cuban authorities [believe] that some of the adverse
effects of tourism that have been experienced by other countries
will be avoided."'"' Physically separating tourists and nationals is
consistent with socialist tourism management:
[T]he creation of remote enclave-type resorts, like Cayo Largo,
enables Cuba to reduce contact between tourists and the general
population. This spatial segregation, along with the functional
segregation inherent in guided tour groups, is a common tourism
management strategy in socialist countries and represents one of
a number of possible strategies for mitigation of negative
impacts."'
117. See generally WORLD TRAVEL & TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL AND TOURISM IN THE
WORLD ECONOMY (1991).
118. Id.
119. GRUPO CUBANO DE ESTUDIos ECON6MICOS, UN ESTUDIO SOBRE CUBA, 1124-25 (1963).
120. Id. at 1126.
121. Zorn & Mayerson, supra note 12, at 291; see also PREZ.-LOPEZ, supra note 12, at
46.
122. Thomas D. Hinch, Cuban Tourism Industry: Its Re-Emergence and Future, 11
TOURISM MGMT. 214, 224 (1990).
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The Cuban government's renewed emphasis on international
tourism began in the mid-1970s when it created INTUR and recog-
nized tourism as an industry capable of contributing to national
development and improving hard currency balances.12 In 1991,
President Castro identified international tourism as one of the key
elements in Cuba's economic development strategy: "We are enter-
ing a field in which we are developing our fabulous natural re-
sources, such as the beauty of our country, the beaches of our
country, which take the place of oil. We have to exploit [our natu-
ral resources]."'1 24 In October 1991, the Fourth Congress of the Cu-
ban Communist Party also recognized tourism as one of the main
strands of Cuba's development strategy for the 1990s. The Fourth
Party Congress adopted the following economic resolution:
Throughout its national territory, Cuba has numerous tourist
sites or resorts, including large beaches and cays. These natural
resources, combined with other positive achievements such as
social stability, a healthy environment, a broad-based health
care system, the hospitality of the Cuban people, and the popu-
latinns'o high level of culture qnd educationa achievement;
make the country an attractive destination for tourists and
[make] tourism an important source of earnings to support eco-
nomic development, employment, and growth of many related
areas of the economy. Efficient development of existing tourist
facilities and those to be built in the future will be a permanent
goal within this industry, and intense work will continue in the
integrated development of tourist facilities.'25
According to Cuba's official statistics, the number of foreign
tourists in Cuba more than tripled during the 1980s from 132,900
in 1981 to 424,000 in 1991, and visitor expenditures increased from
$43.6 million in 1981 to $198 million in 1990, with gross earnings
from tourism reaching $310 million in 1990.12 Cuban officials esti-
mated that gross earnings from international tourism reached
nearly $400 million in 1991 and predicted that they would reach
$600 million in 1992 and $1 billion by 1995.12'7 Tourism officials
123. See, e.g., Norka Clerch, Cuba: La din6mica del turismo, PANORAMA ECON6MIcO
LATINOAMERICANO, Feb. 1991, at 3, 4.
124. PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO, ADDRESS AT THE CEREMONY MARKING THE 38TH ANNIVER-
SARY OF THE MONCADA BARRACKS ATTACK, reproduced in FBIS-LAT, July 30, 1991, at 1, 10.
125. Resolucibn sobre el desarrollo econ6mico, supra note 1, at 3.
126. Maria Dolores Espino, Tourism in Cuba: A Development Strategy for the 1990s?,
23 CUBAN STUDIES (forthcoming Nov. 1993).
127. Alberto Pozo, Turismo: Razones de peso, BOHEMIA, Jan. 10, 1992, at 38-39 (figure
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reported that in the first half of 1992, the number of foreign tour-
ists visiting Cuba rose by 25% and that tourism revenues increased
by 30%."2s
In its thrust to attract foreign investment, Cuba has expressed
a strong preference for investment in tourist projects located in re-
mote areas but has also accepted investments in traditional tourist
sites, such as Varadero Beach. 2 " This is partly because foreign in-
vestors are reluctant to participate in mammoth development
projects for new tourist facilities where there are few, if any, infra-
structure facilities such as water, sewage, airports, and electricity.
Locating international tourism facilities in the midst of popu-
lated areas and limiting the local population's access creates much
friction:
Where conflicts between domestic and foreign tourism do exist,
foreigners usually receive priority as a consequence of their
purchasing power. Tourists spending foreign currency are served
first in restaurants, have access to a better selection of consumer
goods at hard currency stores, and are served by a more efficient
taxi system. While residents are not necessarily officially refused
the privileges which foreign tourists enjoy, they are effectively
denied these goods and services due to the need for payment in
scarce foreign currency. . . . Local frustration . . . seems tem-
pered by Castro's insistence that luxuries like high-cost resort
vacations or lobster should be sold for foreign consumption. In
return, foreign exchange earnings can be used to purchase neces-
sities such as basic foods and medical equipment [which inure]
to the benefit of all Cubans. Nonetheless, foreign journalists
have noted a growing level of local frustration with this situa-
tion, especially among younger Cubans.'30
Some equate Cuba's policy of restricting the use of tourist fa-
for 1991 and estimate for 1992); Alberto Pozo, Venga: Para el bien de todos, BOHEMIA, Feb.
1992, at 38, 40 (estimate for 1995).
128. Cuba dice turismo aument6 en un 25 por ciento, EL NuEvo HERALD (Miami), Aug.
1, 1992, at 4A.
129. Varadero Beach was designated as "polo turistico de primer orden" (tourism resort
of the first degree). Construction of Cuban tourist facilities is an active industry, with hotel
room capacity doubling (to 5200 rooms) between 1985 and 1990. Plans call for hotel capacity
in Varadero to rise to 24,000-30,000 rooms over the next five-year period. Joint ventures
contributed significantly to the expansion of tourism facilities in Varadero Beach, with one
Spanish firm (the Sol-MeliA hotel chain) involved in at least three large hotels in the area:
the MeliA-Varadero, the Sol-Palmeras (also known as Los P~talos), and the Gran Melii Las
Am~ricas. See Fernando Dfvalos, Varadero en grande, BOHEMIA, Oct. 4, 1991, at 11.
130. Hinch, supra note 122, at 223.
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cilities to those with hard currency to a form of "apartheid":"
1
[Cuban officials] say that . . . "tourism apartheid," a phenome-
non in which Cubans are effectively blocked from various stores,
bars, beaches, and restaurants, is unavoidable under conditions
of scarcity. They insist that sacrifices made for the sake of tour-
ists today will pay off in developments for the entire population
tomorrow. 3 '
According to another journalist, managers of the four-star
Comodoro Hotel in Havana placed a letter in the rooms of foreign
tourists in 1990 and 1991 warning the visitors not to invite Cubans
into the hotel. The letter read as follows:
First, foreign tourists should not invite into the hotel anybody
they meet in the street, and should not take any local acquaint-
ances to their rooms. . . . Second, if the guest needs to invite a
Cuban to the hotel bar for a business meeting, the Cuban should
first be taken to the front desk to register his or her name and
his or her ID number. This way, the Comodoro Hotel will be
able to continue assuring its guests the high standards of safety
for which it has always been recognized.-"
With Cuba: going through a period of severe economic auster-
ity caused, in part, by the breakdown of trade relations with East-
ern Europe and the (now former) Soviet Union,' there is a strik-
ing contrast between well-stocked restaurants, bars, and stores
open to tourists with hard currency and the bare shelves of those
open to average Cubans. A journalist who visited Cuba in mid-1992
described the frustrations of a 28-year old mechanic and veteran of
the Angolan War who tried entertaining a foreign friend but was
denied entrance to restaurants and bars:
On the one hand, the country really needs the foreign exchange,
but I don't really like the fact that I can't get in the clubs, the
restaurants, or take a friend out for a drink at a nice place.
There's very little for someone my age to do for
131. See, e.g., Miriam Cabrera, Apartheid a la cubana, EL NuEvo HERALD (Miami),
June 28, 1990, at 15A. For a Cuban view of the same phenomenon, see CArmen Caminas &
Jos6 Mas6, Limited Hotel Access for Nationals Criticized, FBIS-LAT, Apr. 1, 1991, at 12.
132. Glazer & Hollander, supra note 110, at 822.
133. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 56, at 418-19.
134. See, e.g., Jorge F. Prez-L6pez, The Cuban Economy: Rectification in a Changing
World, 16 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 113 (1992); Jorge F. P6rez-Lbpez, Swimming Against the
Tide: Implications for Cuba of Soviet and Eastern European Reforms in Foreign Economic
Relations, 33 J. INTER-AM. STUD. & WORLD AFF. 81 (1991).
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entertainment.' s
A taxi driver explained his frustration in stronger terms:
We [rebelled] 30 years ago to [end] the humiliation of seeing all
of these rich foreigners who came to live the beautiful life here.
However, now we are back at same point: seeing tourists gorging
themselves while we have to tighten our belts more and more.'36
Another analyst provided the following view:
[Blumping industries like tourism to the front of the line brings
on a new kaleidoscope of problems. In pre-Congress discussions
islandwide and at the meeting itself, countless Cubans expressed
their concern at the impact of the 1.5 million well-heeled for-
eigners expected in the country annually by 1995-especially
considering how strapped ordinary Cubans find themselves dur-
ing this tourism development period. And recent surveys show
that the average Cuban still think of themselves [sic] primarily
as a tourism consumer, not provider. But the choices are as real
as they are hard. As Fidel Castro told the national legislature as
early as 1990: the alternative for Cuban families in the short run
is to continue spending their summer vacations at beach front
hotels, or [they can] giv[e] up their rooms to tourists from
abroad whose hard currency is the only way to assure programs
like continued free quality health care.' 3 7
Differential treatment of foreigners and Cuban citizens is a
sensitive issue. Cuba enacted Article 42 of the 1976 Constitution
partly in response to the complaint that in pre-revolutionary Cuba
some tourist facilities were open only to foreigners: "The state con-
secrates the right won by the Revolution for all citizens, without
regard to race, color, or national origin . . .to enjoy the same re-
sorts, beaches, parks, social clubs, and other cultural, sports, recre-
ation, and rest facilities."'3 8
Apparently, in July 1992, the ANPP considered modifying Ar-
ticle 42, but ultimately left it unchanged.' 9 Commenting on the
135. Mimi Whitefield, Cuba: Don't See It like a Cuban-Only Foreign Cash Really
Counts, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 3, 1992, at 14A.
136. Frangois Brousseau, Tourism, General Living Conditions Compared, FBIS-LAT,
Apr. 17, 1991, at 4.
137. GAIL REED, ISLAND IN THE STORM: THE CUBAN COMMUNIST PARTY'S FOURTH CON-
GRESS 128 (1992).
138. CUBAN CONST art. 42 (1976).
139. Due to renumbering, Article 42 in the 1976 Constitution became Article 43 in the
1992 version. There was no substantive change in the article addressing equal access to rec-
reational facilities. However, there was a small change: at the end of the list of bases for
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activities of the ANPP session, President Castro acknowledged this
problem and recommended allowing access by some Cubans to res-
taurants, hotels, and other foreign tourist facilities based on merit:
We have a problem of insufficient resources for distribution
among everyone, and we have no choice but to ration them in
some manner, [to] distribute them selectively to Cubans. There
is not enough for everyone, but those Cubans who deserve it the
most, those who produce the most, those who contribute the
most to the development of the country, these workers get to
use these facilities and the rest is exported. It is an economic
reality. It is not any form of discrimination. It is not any form of
social, religious, nor racial discrimination of any sort. We have
no other choice. It is a reality imposed by the economy. 40
A. Tourism Joint Ventures
In October 1991, the delegates to the Fourth Congress of the
Cuban Communist Party approved economic and social develop-
ment guidelines.q fnr thp 199OCl. Thep. guidelinpe highlighted the im-
portance of international tourism to the economy and called for
"the efficient exploitation of the country's [existing tourism] instal-
lations and those to be built in the future."1 '1
The decision to establish a joint venture is normally the result
of lengthy negotiations among the prospective investor, the domes-
tic partner, and the host government, with each party attempting
to maximize its own objectives. For joint ventures established in
Cuba, the Cuban State is both a domestic partner and the host
government. Thus, the state can direct enterprises to take certain
actions and can also offer incentives to make investment opportu-
nities more attractive to foreign entrepreneurs.
As noted above, Decree No. 50 provides for preferential treat-
ment of joint ventures in international tourism, particularly those
located in designated zones. Special treatment may take the form
of waivers of taxes, tariffs, and other levies, or special regulations
relating to labor, public order, and immigration controls. Tourism
facilities also enjoy the benefits of accelerated depreciation sched-
non-discrimination, the drafters added the phrase "or any other factor injurious to human
dignity." See CUBAN CONST. art 42 (1976); CUBAN CONST. art. 43, reprinted in GRANMA, Sept.
22, 1992, at 6.
140. Castro Speaks on Economic Reality at ANPP, FBIS-LAT, July 15, 1992, at 2, 3.
141. Resoluci6n sobre el desarrollo econ6mico, supra note 1, at 3.
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ules. 142 Subject to approval by the Executive Committee of the
Council of Ministers, international tourism joint ventures can lease
domestic facilities and hire Cuban workers directly. Moreover,
since 1990, Cuba has been willing to consider majority ownership
by foreign investors in priority areas like tourism. 4 ' The Cuban
Government has demonstrated ideological flexibility in this area by
granting tourism joint ventures 25-year leases on land, renewable
for another 25 years. " ' One investor, who negotiated a long-term
lease for prime beach front property, described this process: "[t]he
[Cuban] government as of now gives leaseholds on the land for a
negotiable term of up to 99 years, not unlike what companies are
offered in other places like the Cayman Islands."' 4 Granting 99-
year leaseholds to foreign investors, however, runs contrary to
Cuba's professed contempt for private property and its long-stand-
ing policy against foreign ownership of Cuban property.
The willingness to accommodate foreign investors has led to a
significant foreign presence in the Cuban tourism industry. Twenty
percent of the hotel rooms built in Cuba in early 1992 resulted
from joint ventures."' Over an 18-month period spanning roughly
from the fourth quarter of 1990 through the first quarter of 1992,
international tourism joint ventures created 30,000 new jobs on the
island, bringing total employment in such joint ventures to 50,000;
an additional 20,000 jobs were expected by the end of 1992. 4'
President Castro reported that the payback period for foreign in-
vestments in tourism facilities is as short as three years; 48 other
Cuban sources have reported the payback period as ranging from
3.5 years'4 to four or five years.150 Short payback periods are nec-
essary to compensate, in part, for the very high political risks asso-
ciated with investments in Cuba.'5 '
142. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., French, supra note 47, at A18; Chamber of Commerce Invites Foreign
Investment, supra note 48, at 3.
144. FrrrIPALDI, supra note 13, at 24.
145. Id. at 64.
146. Id. at 24.
147. Se reactiva el sector turistico de Cuba, NOVEDADES, Apr. 29, 1992, at B7 (citing
Pedro Ross Leal, General Secretary of the Confederation of Cuban Workers).
148. CASTRO, supra note 49, at 48.
149. Turismo: Razones de peso, supra note 127, at 39.
150. KAPLOWITZ & KAPLOWITZ, supra note 3, at 23.
151. Cuba placed 165th out of 169 in a recent ranking of countries on the basis of in-
vestment risks in 1992; North Korea ranked 167, and Cambodia 169. See Country Risk:
Nowhere to Lend To, EUROMONEY, Sept. 1992, at 65, 70.
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B. Labor and Tourism
As discussed above, in the 1960s and 1970s tourism developed
very little in Cuba. Not only did the physical facilities for interna-
tional tourists deteriorate during this period, but the Cuban labor
force lost many of the skills associated with the high-quality ser-
vice that international tourism markets demand. 52
Cuban tourism authorities have identified quality of service as
an important factor in generating repeat visits from foreign tour-
ists.5  The return rate, in turn, is a key variable in determining
the profitability of international tourism facilities. To improve the
quality of service, Cuba has initiated a broad program to enhance
the skills of workers in the international tourism industry includ-
ing the creation of special vocational intermediate schools, class-
room education, on-the-job training, and travel abroad programs
which enable workers to specialize in specific tourism-related
occupations.154
Cuban tourism authorities have also focused on attitudinal
problems, which they equate with lack of worker discipline. In an
interview published in September 1989, INTUR's Director of Per-
sonnel Development was asked whether he was satisfied with the
quality of service in the international tourism industry. He
responded:
If I were to gauge [the quality of service] on the basis of statis-
tics ... I would have to respond in the affirmative. However, I
always ask myself the question another way. How much income
did we fail to realize because of deficiencies in service? ...
[S]ervice is our Achilles' heel. A significant part of these defi-
ciencies are related to subjective factors, the attitude of the
worker. Everyone understands the importance of earning hard
currency, but not everyone internalizes his or her own role in
this task. Because of this, and because we are socialists, it is so
important that we have training anchored on a solid ideological
base.15
At the May 1990 inauguration of a hotel in Varadero built as a
joint venture with Spanish investors, President Castro bluntly de-
152. Hinch, supra note 122, at 220.
153. See Alberto Pozo, iFunciona el servicio basado en la conciencia?, BOHEMIA, Sept.
15, 1989, at 48.
154. See id. at 52.
155. Id. at 49.
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scribed the problem of inadequately trained and disciplined tour-
ism personnel:
Of course, these workers [in older tourism enterprises] learned
here. How did they manage the hotel? By mistreating tourists.
They wanted to serve them, but did not know how. Someone
once said-and I thought it was very funny because I believe it
tells the truth-a Cuban is the most hospitable man or person in
the world, the most pleasant and thoughtful, but once he puts
on a waiter's uniform, he is terrible.' 58
IV. A SPECIAL REGIME FOR TOURISM WORKERS
Given the importance of labor to the international tourism in-
dustry, the Cuban government has issued supplementary laws and
regulations in the area of labor relations that apply exclusively to
this sector of the economy.157 This legal regime has created a sepa-
rate, and arguably more strict, set of rules for Cuban workers em-
ployed in international tourism facilities.
On August 13, 1990, the Cuban government enacted Decree
No. 122, "On Special Labor Regulations for Workers in the Inter-
national Tourism System."' 58 The law's stated objective is to cre-
ate a system of labor relations for the international tourism indus-
try that guarantees excellence in the provision of services.'59 To
excel, according to the legislation's preamble, workers in the inter-
national tourism system must demonstrate suitability for employ-
ment and aptitude to perform their assigned duties. These workers
must be specially trained, adequately compensated, and disci-
plined when necessary for misconduct.
Subsequent regulations have created a general framework for
labor relations applicable to workers in the international tourism
156. Castro Speaks at Partnership Hotel Inauguration, FBIS-LAT, May 17, 1990, at 1,
3.
157. The Cuban approach of singling out one segment of the labor force for special
treatment differs from that taken by the Soviet Union, for example, in modifying its labor
laws to attract foreign investment. See, e.g., Christopher F. Clarke, The Soviet Joint Ven-
ture Decree and Soviet Labor Law, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 761 (1990).
158. Sobre regulaciones laborales especiales para los trabajadores del sistema de tur-
ismo internacional [On Special Labor Regulations for International Tourism Workers], De-
cree No. 122, GACETA OFICIAL, Aug. 13, 1990, at 27 [hereinafter Decree No. 122]; see also
Dictan regulaciones especiales para trabajadores del turismo internacional, TRABAJADORES,
Sept. 26, 1990, at 2.
159. Decree No. 122, supra note 158, pmbl.
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system. The State Committee on Labor and Social Security
("CETSS") has issued regulations regarding suitability for employ-
ment, remuneration, promotion and training,"" and worker disci-
pline.16 ' INTUR issued its own regulations to deal with the reha-
bilitation and reinstatement of tourism workers who have been
disciplined.
16 2
The next two sections in this Part describe the legal frame-
work for labor relations and detail the issues outlined by the im-
plementing regulations: suitability, remuneration, promotion and
training, work discipline, rehabilitation, and reinstatement.
A. General Provisions
Decree No. 122 provides for the creation of "representative
commissions" in each enterprise, establishment, workplace, or unit
within the international tourism system.6 8 The member of the Ex-
ecutive Committee responsible for overseeing the international
touricsm industry dPtermines which ".ntPrnriqs est. lishment.s,
workplaces, or units" are part of the international tourism sys-
tem.'6 " Each commission consists of three members: a representa-
tive of management (who chairs the commission), a member of the
existing workers' organization, and a worker elected by peers on
the basis of prestige and authority. 165 The commission evaluates
and makes determinations regarding the suitability and aptitude of
workers for employment, promotions, and training assignments.
The commission also reviews the disciplinary actions of
160. Resolution No. 15/90 of the State Committee on Labor and Social Security,
GACETA OFICIAL, Sept. 15, 1990, at 584.
161. Resolution No. 14/90 of the State Committe on Labor and Social Security, GACETA
OFICIAL, Sept. 15, 1990, at 579.
162. Resolution No. 85 of the National Tourism Institute, GACETA OFIcIAL, Sept. 28,
1990, at 621.
163. Decree No. 122, supra note 158, art. 1.
164. Id. special provision I. Each of the vice-presidents of the Council of Ministers
oversees one or more agencies of the central state administration. In the late 1980s, there
were 10 vice-presidents. At that time, the National Tourism Institute was under the super-
vision of Vice-President Osmani Cienfuegos, who had similar authority over the State Com-
mittee on Finance, the State Committee on Labor and Social Security, and the State Com-
mittee for Material-Technical Supply.
165. Id. The preamble to Decree No. 122 provides: "The Cuban Workers Central
[Cuba's exclusive labor union confederation] and other organizations, in accordance with
Article 7 of the Constitution of the Republic, have agreed to undertake the functions as-
signed to them pursuant to this Law-decree." Id. pmbl.
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management.'
Decree No. 122 establishes a probationary period of 180 days
for new workers in the international tourism system. 16
7 During this
period, either the employee or employer can end the employment
relationship without further proceedings. Once the probationary
period has ended, however, the employment relationship becomes
a formal employment contract of indefinite duration, provided the
commission concurs with the management's assessment that the
worker is suitable and apt.
Workers in the international tourism system must meet cer-
tain suitability and aptitude standards designed to guarantee "effi-
ciency," "responsible behavior," "appropriate conduct," and "pro-
fessionalism" in the performance of their functions." 8 The
Minister-President of the State Committee on Labor and Social
Security is charged with issuing the regulations that define suita-
bility and aptitude for employment and the procedures for deter-
mining worker suitability."6 9 Failure to meet one or more of the
suitability standards is cause for the immediate termination of the
employment relationship.1 7 0 Workers who are dismissed for lack of
suitability are eligible to receive severance pay equivalent to sixty
days of pay.1 71 A joint venture that terminates a job position be-
cause of reorganization or restructuring must offer reasonable al-
ternative employment to the displaced employee, but if the worker
does not accept the alternative job offer, the joint venture may ter-
minate the employment relationship.
1 7 2
Decree No. 122 allows the CETSS to create a special compen-
sation system for workers in the international tourism system. The
compensation system consists of regular pay plus a pay premium
that is particular to each tourist facility. The compensation system
encourages training and promotion to occupations that are more
complex or that entail a higher level of responsibility.1 3 In addi-
tion, there is an annual pay supplement, tied to the performance of
the enterprise. For joint ventures created pursuant to Decree No.
50, the pay supplement must be established by the statutes that
166. Id. art. 2.
167. Id. art. 4.
168. Id. art. 5.
169. Id. transitory provision II.
170. Id. art. 6.
171. Id. art. 7.
172. Id. art. 8.
173. Id. art. 9.
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created the joint venture. 174
Decree No. 122 also provides for the establishment of a disci-
plinary code for the international tourism sector. 170 Only the high-
est-ranking management official in a workplace can dismiss work-
ers, or order their transfer to another workplace without
reinstatement rights, but all such actions are subject to approval
by the representative commission.'7 Lower-ranking management
officials may impose sanctions in the form of a public or private
reprimand, temporary assignment to a lower-paying position, or
suspension from work for up to thirty days. 1 77
Decree No. 122 establishes an appeals process for reviewing
disciplinary decisions. Workers who are dismissed or transferred
may appeal to the highest-ranking management official within the
enterprise, who either confirms or revokes the action, subject to
approval by the appropriate representative commission.' 8 Workers
may appeal other disciplinary measures to higher-level manage-
ment officials, but such decisions are also subject to the approval of
the representative commission. 7 9 Disciplinary measures within the
international tourism system, however, are not subject to adminis-
trative or judicial review. 80
B. Suitability
Chapter 2 of Resolution No. 15/90, issued on September 5,
1990, defines the suitability and aptitude standards for workers in
the international tourism system.' In every workplace, the repre-
174. Id. art. 10.
175. Id. art. 11. The CETSS, representatives of state organizations, the National Union
of Commercial and Food Service Workers, and other labor organizations are charged with
jointly developing the code, but only CETSS can implement it.
176. Id. art. 12.
177. Id.
178. Id. art. 13.
179. Id. art. 14.
180. Id. art. 16. Once a worker has been dismissed or transferred from the international
tourism system, the worker may be retrained and rehabilitated. Id. special provision IV.
181. The standards are as follows: 1) proper conduct; 2) proper professional behavior in
work activities, efficiency, excellence in the provision of services, and proper behavior to-
ward tourists; 3) no improper or undue contacts with foreigners; 4) proper use of social
property and material resources of the industry; 5) no improper behavior, whether or not
unlawful, that might affect the public image and prestige of a worker in the international
tourism system; and 6) no infringement of labor discipline that would result in actions in-
compatible with international tourism activities. Resolution No. 15/90, supra note 160 art.
6.
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sentative commission evaluates each worker to determine whether
or not the worker meets these criteria. The commission meets per-
sonally with those who fall below the standards.' 3 If they are un-
suitable, the commission may dismiss them from their current em-
ployment at once, although they may receive severance pay
equivalent to sixty days' salary. 183 Workers who are "not apt" are
assigned to other duties, with no loss in pay, provided a position is
available. 184 The commission also holds general meetings with all
workers who meet the standards to inform them of their overall
results in the evaluations. 85
When the commission finds a worker to be deficient, the
worker may contest the findings before the commission within five
days of being informed. 8 6 Failure to contest makes the finding fi-
nal and results in formal termination of the employment relation-
ship or reassignment.'8 7 The commission has five days to consider
appeals and issue final rulings.' 88 Workers then have five days to
appeal the finding of the workplace commission to a (higher-level)
representative commission of the enterprise,' 89 which has twenty
days to issue a final ruling.' 90 The rulings of the representative
commissions, however, are not subject to either administrative or
judicial review.' 9'
C. Remuneration
Regulation No. 15/90 establishes the remuneration package for
workers in the international tourism industry. For these workers,
compensation consists of two elements: 1) a monthly salary related
to the occupation or work assignment; and 2) a pay premium based
on both the profitability of the enterprise and the degree of the
worker's contact with foreign tourists.!2 The pay premium ranges
from 20 to 100 pesos per month per worker. In exceptional cases,
182. Id. art. 7.
183. Id. art. 9.
184. Id. art. 15.
185. Id. art. 16.
186. Id. art. 8.
187. Id. art. 10.
188. Id. art. 11.
189. Id. art. 12.
190. Id. art. 13
191. Id. art. 14.
192. Id. art. 22.
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the premium may be even higher." 8
The amount of the premium for workers in a given enterprise
is based on, inter alia, the following criteria:
1) the category of the enterprise based on the quality of
service it provides (e.g., the number of "stars" that may be
associated with a hotel or restaurant);
2) fulfillment of work norms;
3) degree to which job flexibility is practiced;
4) degree to which a foreign language is used;
5) unusual labor conditions;
6) extent to which night work is required;
7) extent to which workers must live within the facilities;
8) efficiency in the generation of hard currency; and
9) work schedules.
1 9 4
Individual workers forfeit up to 50% of their pay bonus if they
do not fulfill their work requirements. 195 To this end, management
evaluates, on a monthly basis, the overall performance of each
worker, including attendance, punctuality, work efficiency, fulfil-
ment of norms, discipline, and quality of service. Based on these
evaluations, management may reduce the pay premium in cases of
poor performance."9 " Management may also give a pay supplement




In exceptional circumstances, outstanding workers may receive
pay supplements even though the work unit as a whole did not
193. Id. art. 24.
194. Id. art. 25.
195. Id. art. 27.
196. Id.
197. Id. art. 28. To be eligible for these supplements, the meritorious workers must
work in facilities that meet the following additional criteria:
1) For hotels, motels, tourist villas and apartments, recreation facilities, restaurants, night
clubs, and international travel services:
a) overfulfillment of the hard currency revenue plans related to discretionary
expenditures (i.e., those activities not included in pre-paid "tour packages");
b) positive evaluations for quality of service.
2) For stores catering to international tourists:
a) positive evaluations for quality of service.
3) For tourist transportation:
a) overfulfillment of the hard currency revenue plan related to discretionary ex-
penditures (i.e., those activities not included in pre-paid "tour packages");
b) positive evaluations for quality of service.
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meet the required criteria.198 Resolution No. 15/90 creates a special
fund financed by a payroll tax to pay such outstanding workers a
supplement of up to 100% of their regular salaries.
1 99
For some occupations, the monthly work tour may be as long
as 280 hours, with pay adjusted accordingly. In exceptional cases,
the monthly work tour may be set as high as 312 hours when the
occupation requires overnight stays.200 For example, longer work
tours may be necessary for workers in the tourist facilities at Cayo
Largo del Sur and for those who operate retail stores for
tourists. 0'
Workers employed by joint ventures with foreign partners (es-
tablished pursuant to Decree No. 50) are eligible for a pay differen-
tial of 30% (based on basic pay plus pay supplements) if they work
in five-star hotels and 20% if they work in other facilities. These
workers are also eligible for payments from the worker incentive
fund to which all foreign joint ventures must contribute.
202
D. Promotion and Training
As noted above, Decree 122 establishes a probationary period
of 180 days for new employees in the international tourism sector.
Chapter 3 of Resolution 15/90 stipulates that only after probation-
ary workers have demonstrated suitability and aptitude, are they
eligible to enter permanent employment relationships.
20 3
The representative commission of each workplace makes the
decisions regarding the entry of new workers into the labor force,
the formalization of the employment contracts, and promotions.
20 4
The commission also makes recommendations regarding special-
ized training for workers, but to make such recommendations, the
representative commission must be augmented to include two well-
respected workers in the occupation under consideration.
2 05
The regulation also requires that the management of each in-
ternational tourism facility develop a plan to train the worker in
198. Id. art. 29.
199. Id. art. 30.
200. Id. art. 31.
201. Id. special provision III.
202. Cuban Joint Venture Law, supra note 9, special provision I, 21 I.L.M. at 1110.
203. Resolution No. 15/90, supra note 160, art. 18.
204. Id. art. 3.
205. Id. art. 4.
1992]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
foreign language skills, if management and labor agree that such
training is necessary. Workers who fail to acquire proficiency in
foreign language skills, either because they are unsuccessful in
completing the proposed training or because they refuse to take it,
will be shifted to other positions within the international tourism
system. If such reassignments are not possible, management may
terminate the employment relationship."'
E. Discipline
Resolution 14/90, issued on the same day as Resolution 15/90,
is the Disciplinary Code for workers engaged in international tour-
ism activities. The Code sets forth the proper conduct for workers,
defines behavior that is unacceptable, and establishes disciplinary
measures and administrative procedures.2" 7 The Code sets forth
detailed examples of proper and improper conduct.
Article 5 of Resolution 14/90 sets conduct requirements for in-
ternational tourism workers. In addition to addressing attendance,
hours of work,, proper uniform, and compliancA with nccUpationRl
safety and health standards, there are several specific restrictions
that exemplify Cuba's efforts to minimize contact between workers
and international tourists. These include the requirements that in-
ternational tourism workers:20 s
1) must turn into management all goods and publications
that tourists may leave upon their departure;
2) must be discreet with regard to matters related to their
workplace and information to which they may have
learned by virtue of the job they hold;
3) must exchange, at the official rate, any hard currency
received in the form of tips and other gratuities;
4) must not be a source of annoyance to foreign tourists,
including interfering with the rest periods of tourists or
with their private conversations, or pretending to have
abilities or functions other than those related to their
occupation;
5) must not accept invitations from foreigners unless they
have the proper authorization; and
6) must not walk around the workplace without authoriza-
206. Id. transitory provision I.
207. Resolution No. 14/90, supra note 161, art. 1.
208. Id. arts. 5-6.
[Vol. 24:2
1992] JOINT VENTURES IN TOURISM
tion, unless pursuing work functions.
Article 6 of Resolution 14/90 sets forth examples of improper
conduct for workers in the international tourism industry. Several
of these prohibitions are vague, subjective, and arguably violative
of individual freedoms. 20 9 A worker who breaches this code is sub-
ject to various disciplinary measures.
1 '
Resolution No. 14/90 establishes an administrative procedure
for imposing disciplinary measures. Such procedures must be initi-
ated within thirty days of learning that a violation has 
occurred,2 1 1
though this period may be extended for up to fifteen days if an
investigation is necessary.211
2 There is also a one-year statutory
limit for imposing disciplinary measures21
The severity of disciplinary measures should be proportional
to the significance of the violation, its consequences, the circum-
stances surrounding the event, the character of the offender, and
the offender's intent, work record, and conduct record."
4 As a pre-
cautionary measure, management may suspend the worker without
pay, or transfer the worker to another assignment for up to thirty
days, until a final decision is made on the violation.
21 The admin-
istrative procedures for imposing disciplinary measures require
that management maintain extensive written records of the
worker's rehabilitation.' When management recommends the
209. For example, workers in the international tourism industry may not: I) engage in
behavior that may be illegal or undesirable, whether in the workplace or outside of it, that
might tarnish the exemplary moral and social image of international tourism workers; 2)
take advantage of a client or any other party to obtain goods or services that are earmarked
for the consumption of tourists; 3) guide tourists or other individuals to areas where visits
are prohibited, or to zones where access is restricted, unless specifically authorized to do so;
4) engage in, or promote, arguments with co-workers or other persons, or criticize national
tourism authorities, tourism enterprises, or any other government agency in the presence of
tourists and visitors; 5) operate television sets, radios, or tape recorders without authoriza-
tion, or tune into improper channels or stations while on duty. Id. art. 6.
210. These disciplinary measures include the following: 1) private reprimand; 2) public
reprimand; 3) temporary transfer to another work assignment of lower pay or classification,
or to another workplace, for up to a year, but with the right of reinstatement to the original
job; 4) suspension from the job for up to thirty days; 5) permanent transfer to another
assignment, without the right of reinstatement to the original position; and 6) dismissal
from the workplace, and termination of the relationship between the worker and the inter-
national tourism system. Id. art. 8.
211. Id. art. 10.
212. Id. art. 12.
213. Id. art. 11.
214. Id. art. 13.
215. Id. art. 14.
216. Id. art. 16.
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sanctions of dismissal or transfer without reinstatement rights, the
representative commission must confirm the decision.2"7
Workers subjected to disciplinary measures may appeal to
management within ten days of the decision,2 1 8 and management
must consult the representative commission when hearing ap-
peals.2 1 9 Though an appeal may result in the ratification, modifica-
tion, or revocation of the originally imposed disciplinary mea-
sure,"2 ° the outcome of the appeal process is not subject to
administrative or judicial review.
2 1
However, in exceptional cases, management may review a dis-
ciplinary measure for up to one year after its implementation. 2 2
Grounds for such review include new evidence which was not avail-
able at the time of the original decision, or proof that the earlier
decision was arbitrary or unjust.
22 3
F. Rehabilitation and Reinstatement
Resolution No. 85 of the National Tourism Institute, issued on
September 6, 1990, sets time limits within which workers dismissed
from the international tourism system, or transferred to another
job without reinstatement rights, may be rehabilitated and recon-
sidered for employment within the system. The international tour-
ism system may consider transferred workers for reemployment,
but only after the workers successfully complete three years of re-
habilitation from the date of the disciplinary measure. 2 4 The reha-
bilitation period for dismissed workers is five years.22
In some cases, management may shorten the rehabilitation pe-
riod. For example, management may shorten the rehabilitation pe-
riod with the advice of the labor union, if the worker has demon-
strated exemplary conduct or has performed exceptionally well in a
particular area.22' But if the worker is disciplined again while in
rehabilitation, then the primary rehabilitation period is suspended
217. Id. art. 16(c).
218. Id. art. 18.
219. Id. art. 22.
220. Id. art. 23.
221. Id. art. 25.
222. Id. art. 27.
223. Id. art. 26.
224. Resolution No. 85, supra note 162, provision IV.
225. Id. provision V.
226. Id. provision VII.
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while the worker is disciplined for the more recent infringement.2 7
V. A COMPARISON OF THE SPECIAL LABOR REGIME FOR
INTERNATIONAL TOURISM WORKERS AND THE CUBAN LABOR CODE
One of the major accomplishments of the National Assembly
of People's Power in December 1984 was the adoption of a Labor
Code (C6digo de Trabajo), Cuba's first labor code and the only
socialist labor code in the Americas.2 28 The Cuban Labor Code
consists of 308 articles, covering a wide range of labor matters.
This Article does not engage in a detailed analysis of the Cuban
Labor Code, because commentators have already examined its cov-
erage and substantive provisions.229 Instead, this Article examines
the differences between the 1984 Cuban Labor Code and the labor
relations system in international tourism. The most prominent dif-
ferences are in the areas of employment contracts,"' remunera-
tion,23 1 worker discipline,2 3 and labor dispute resolution.
2 3 3
227. Id. provision VI.
228. CoDIGO DE TRABAJO, LAw No. 49, GACETA OpicmIA, Apr. 24, 1985, at 5 (final, revised
version of the Code) [hereinafter CUBAN LABOR CODE]. The Cuban Labor Code is also re-
printed in FRANCISCO GUILLPN LANDRIAN, LA CODIFICACION DEL DERECHO LABORAL EN CUBA
108 (1987), and an English translation can be found in Cuba: Labour Code, LEGISLATIVE
SERIES No. 3, 1985, at 29 . Without diminishing its significance, it should be noted that the
1984 Labor Code, which became effective on July 26, 1985, broke little new ground and is
essentially a compilation and harmonization of then-existing labor legislation. See GUILLtN
LANDRIAN, supra, at 12.
229. See, e.g., GUILLIkN LANDRIAN, supra note 228; Antonio Raudilio Martin Sinchez,
Comments on the Labour Code of the Republic of Cuba, LEGISLATIVE SERIES No. 3, 1985, at
11; Lydia Guevara Ramirez, El derecho al trabajo, principio fundamental del derecho
laboral cubano, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO, Apr.-June 1988, at 143; Lydia Guevara Rami-
rez, Los principios del derecho laboral socialista en el C6digo de Trabajo de la Rephblica
de Cuba, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO, Oct.-Dec. 1988, at 3; Gretel Hernindez Oliva, Las
normas internacionales del trabajo y la legislacibn laboral cubana, REVISTA CUBANA DE
DERECHO, Oct.-Dec. 1988, at 15; Leocadio Pascual Diaz, El Cbdigo de Trabajo y la en-
sehanza en el Derecho Laboral, REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO, Oct.-Dec. 1988, at 59; EFRtN
C6RDOVA, EL TRABAJADOR CUBANO EN EL ESTADO DE OBREROS Y CAMPESINOS 45-51 (1990). For
journalistic accounts of the contents and process of adoption of the Cuban Labor Code, see
Ren6 Gonzilez Mendoza, El Cbdigo de Trabajo, una ley fiel a los trabajadores, GRANMA,
July 4, 1984, at 2; Ren6 Gonzalez Mendoza, lQu& es el Cbdigo de Trabajo?, BOHEMIA, May
10, 1985, at 58; Ren6 Gonzilez Mendoza, Un Cdigo de Trabajo Socialista, BOHEMIA, July 5,
1985, at 61.
230. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, ch. 2.
231. Id. ch. 4.
232. Id. ch. 6.




The special rules for international tourism workers arise under
article 6 of the Cuban Labor Code, which allows for modification of
the Cuban Labor Code by legislation addressing issues particular
to certain economic activities. 34
The Cuban Labor Code creates "evaluation committees" in
every workplace which are similar to the representative commis-
sions created by Decree No. 122 for the international tourism sys-
tem. Each workplace has an evaluation committee to assess the
technical qualifications of workers."'5 These committees consist of
a management representative, a labor union representative, and
"qualified workers in whatever occupation is being reviewed." '36
The evaluation committees are similar to the representative com-
missions, in that they both include "well respected" workers from
the specific occupation. 3 ' Evaluation committees, unlike represen-
tative commissions, cannot evaluate the suitability or aptitude of
workers, or review the disciplinary actions of management.2 38
In the international tourism industry, the representative com-
mission makes recommendations to the management on hiring
workers, formalization of the employment contract, promotions,
and training. Because the representative commission is likely to be
composed of workers committed to socialist ideals,39 a worker who
does not share such a commitment to socialism may be at a disad-
vantage before the commission. Representative commissions have
broad powers to address issues of character and attitude not di-
rectly related to the workplace. In this sense, the representative
commission's power resembles that of the intrusive Committees for
the Defense of the Revolution (Comit~s de Defensa de la Revolu-
234. In addition to the special labor regime for workers in the international tourism
industry, special regimes for workers in other sectors have also been issued pursuant to the
authority in article 6 of the Cuban Labor Code. For example, a special labor regime for
workers of the Customs Service was issued in 1991. See GACETA OFICIAL, Nov. 30, 1991, at
43.
235. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 47.
236. Id. art. 47.
237. See id.; Resolution No. 15/90, supra note 160, arts. 3, 4.
238. See CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 47; Resolution No. 15/90, supra note
160, arts. 6-8.
239. Though Resolution No. 15/90 does not define "well respected workers," the term
presumably includes workers who are unqualifiedly committed to the political system. See
CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 47; Decree No. 122, supra note 158, special provi-
sion I.
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ci6n, "CDRs"), the neighborhood committees that watch over citi-
zens who do not openly support the revolution.2 °
In November 1990, in the midst of an economic crisis when
companies had to relocate workers as a result of shortages in im-
ported fuels and raw materials, the CETSS issued Resolution No.
18/90 setting forth rules for the acquisition, retention, reassign-
ment, promotion, and retraining of all workers.2 41 The implementa-
tion of these new rules rested on workplace-level commissions con-
sisting of management and union representatives, along with
"workers of recognized prestige, approved by an open assembly of
workers. 2 42 The workers selected had to "hold a high level of pres-
tige among all workers, [as] demonstrated through [superior] work
performance and [positive] attitude.2148 Thus, serving on the com-
missions is a recognition of exemplary behavior. Among other du-
ties, these commissions may, at management's request, examine
the suitability and aptitude of workers and may make recommen-
dations to management on retraining, reassignment, or
dismissal.
2 44
While the powers of these workplace commissions (created by
Resolution No. 18/90) go beyond those of the "evaluation commit-
tees" of the Cuban Labor Code in that the former can assess suita-
bility and aptitude and can make recommendations on reassign-
ment or dismissal, they fall short of those of the representative
commissions in the international tourism industry. The latter's
unique powers include review of disciplinary actions taken by
management.
240. See JUAN M. DEL AGUILA, CUBA: DILEMMAS OF A REVOLUTION, 182 (1988). Founded
in 1960, the CDRs are the backbone of the revolution, serving different purposes and mobil-
izing popular support when the occasion requires it. Started as neighborhood committees
designed to protect the revolution from its internal enemies and emphasizing vigilance and
outright persecution of suspected counter revolutionaries, the CDRs gradually assumed
other functions without ever giving up their original mission. CDR militants have also
hounded individuals who do not support the revolution, condemned all forms of antisocial
behavior, and collaborated with local authorities in policing neighborhoods. In 1980, accord-
ing to eyewitness accounts from Mariel refugees, the CDRs sponsored "repudiation meet-
ings" designed to chastise, browbeat, and humiliate citizens who wanted to leave Cuba. See
also, e.g., JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ, CUBA: ORDER AND REVOLUTION 261-267 (1978); JUAN CLARK,
CUBA: Mrro y REALIDAD 134-140 (1990).
241. State Committee on Labor and Social Security, Resolution No. 18/90, GACETA
OFICIAL, November 9, 1990, at 310.
242. Id. art. 3.
243. Id. art. 4.




Article 53 of the Cuban Labor Code defines causes for which
management may terminate either a permanent employment con-
tract, or an apprenticeship contract.""5 These reasons include: the
worker's unsuitability for the assigned occupation or post; the
worker's failure to perform conditions specifically stated in the
contract; and the worker's proven incapacity to perform a particu-
lar task. 46
A glossary annexed to the Cuban Labor Code defines the stan-
dards for a worker's suitability to be "[t]he set of qualities that a
worker must possess [to] make him or her apt, given work require-
ments, for a specific occupation or post."247 Neither the Cuban La-
bor Code nor Resolution No. 18/90 elaborate on the specific quali-
ties or behavior that makes a worker suitable or apt.2 18 Moreover,
no provision in the Cuban Labor Code requires an evaluation of a
worker's suitability. or aptitude after the probationary period.
While a workplace commission established pursuant to Resolution
lC/90v m-nay evaluate the s--UttULitilty adtU aptitude Of workers, iu can
only recommend a course of action for management to take. When
attempting to dismiss or reassign the worker, management has the
burden of proving that the worker lacks suitability or aptitude.
Suitability and aptitude considerations are very prominent in
the regulations that apply to workers in the international tourism
system. Resolution No. 15/90 specifically sets forth suitability and
aptitude standards for workers in this sector. For example, display-
ing "improper behavior, whether or not unlawful, that might affect
[the worker's] .public image and prestige as a worker of the inter-
national tourism system" makes a worker unfit.249 The suitability
and aptitude standards in Resolution No. 15/90 seem to place a
much heavier emphasis on personal qualities and behavior than on
the performance of the work assignment. Thus, the "social conduct
of the worker in the area in which he or she lives" is an important
criterion in determining suitability.2 50 These considerations are less
245. See CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, arts. 53, 232; see generally FRANCISCO
GUILL]N LANDRIAN, EL CONTRATO DE TRABAJO, SU SUSPENSI6N Y TERMINACI6N (1991).
246. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 53.
247. Id. glossary.
248. See Caridad Lafita Navarro, Hablemos de idoneidad, TRABAJADORES, Mar. 23,
1992, at 5. Unfortunately, Navarro does not go beyond what is expressed in the legislation.
249. Resolution No. 15/90, supra note 160, art. 6(d).
250. Comenz6 aplicaci6n de regulaciones laborales especiales para el turismo interna-
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important under the Cuban Labor Code.
Under the international tourism system, all workers, whether
recent entrants still under probationary status or tenured workers
laboring under existing employment contracts, are subject to re-
views of their personal conduct, behavior, and attitude. These re-
views determine whether workers can continue to hold jobs. In
contrast, the Cuban Labor Code has no provision for reviewing the
suitability or aptitude of workers who have successfully completed
a probationary period.
The labor law regime for international tourism workers also
provides different procedures for transferring or dismissing unsuit-
able or inapt workers. Once the representative commission evalu-
ates a worker's record and finds a worker unsuitable, the commis-
sion can take immediate action.2 5' Rulings of the representative
commission regarding suitability or aptitude of workers are not
subject to the dispute settlement procedures contained in chapter
12 of the Cuban Labor Code with regard to either appeal rights or
time limits. Under the Cuban Labor Code, labor disputes may be
appealed to a labor council (consejo de trabajo) and subsequently
to a municipal people's tribunal; 5 ' in some instances a party may
appeal a decision to a provincial people's tribunal. 5 ' The Cuban
Labor Code gives workers 180 days to appeal actions that affect
their rights."5 4 Workers in the international tourism industry have
very limited appeal rights; they have only ten days to contest a
decision of the representative commission, and they must do so
before the same representative commission.2 5 The commission
must respond with a final ruling within five days.25 A tourism
worker has five days to appeal this finding to a higher-level repre-
sentative commission (within the enterprise), which will issue a
ruling within 20 days.2 57 This latter ruling, however, is not appeala-
cional, TRABAJADORES, Nov. 17, 1990, at 4.
251. In the international tourism industry, the result is immediate dismissal, though
the worker does receive severance pay equivalent to sixty days' salary. When the ruling is
lack of aptitude, management must temporarily reassign the worker to another position and
attempt to place the worker permanently in another job, without loss of pay. See supra part
IV.B.
252. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 250.
253. Id. art. 254.
254. Id. art. 259.
255. Resolution No. 14/90, supra note 161, art. 18.
256. Id. art. 19.
257. Id. art. 22.
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ble before courts or administrative agencies.
258
C. Remuneration
Chapter 4 of the Cuban Labor Code outlines the elements of
compensation for all Cuban workers: salary; bonuses for overfulfill-
ment of work norms (primas); shift differentials; longevity bo-
nuses; holiday pay; and extended duty pay.259 Workers are guaran-
teed a monthly salary, in accordance with a scale established by
the Council of Ministers.
Workers in the international tourism system are eligible for
these salary elements, and in addition are eligible for some that are
not available to workers in the economy at large. Regulation No.
15/90 goes beyond the Cuban Labor Code and defines specific
forms of compensation for workers in the international tourism in-
dustry. For example, workers can receive bonuses (primas) ranging
from 20 to 100 pesos per month-not an insignificant amount con-
sidering that the basic pay rates for typical tourism workers in the
,nnrl 1 QSRA xsrnra 00.1RQ7 nanono --- ~+I,-at n- , oln - o
(premios) for outstanding workers can be as high as 100% of their
258. Id. art. 25.
259. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 103 (salaries); id. art. 107 (bonuses for
overfulfillment of work norms); id. art. 108 (differentials for abnormal working conditions);
id. art. 109 (shift differentials); id. art. 111 (longevity bonuses); id. art. 112 (holiday pay); id.
art. 67 (hours of work).
According to the wage scale set in 1981, the monthly salary for non -agricultural workers
ranged from 93 to 254 pesos; for administrative and service workers, from 85 to 231 pesos;
for technicians, from 128 to 450 pesos; and for managers, from 111 to 450 pesos. DHARAM
GHAI ET AL., LABOUR AND DEVELOPMENT IN CUBA 39 (1988).
According to data provided by Cuba to the International Labour Office, workers in four
occupations likely to be heavily represented in the international tourism industry earned the
following monthly salaries (in pesos per month):
Worker 1984 1985 1986
Hotel receptionist 143 135 135
Cook 185 187 187
Waiter 154 154 154
Chambermaid 99 99 99
Jorge F. Prez-L6pez, Wages, Earnings, Hours of Work, and Retail Prices in Cuba, 19 CU-
BAN STUD. 199, 213 (1989).
The CETSS determines which occupation falls within each scale, and hence the salary.
CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 104. The Cuban Labor Code contains an explicit
preference for payment based on piece work, because such forms of compensation stimulate
productivity and optimal use of time at work. Id. art. 105.
Some enterprises are permitted to establish special funds to reward workers whose pro-
ductivity exceeds the norm (premios). Id. art. 127. Similarly, the Cuban Labor Code allows
for the payment of special bonuses to stimulate fulfilment of specific objectives. Id. art. 128.
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monthly salary. The size of these incentives demonstrates Cuba's
commitment to international tourism.
The Cuban Labor Code generally protects workers from em-
ployers who require excessive overtime. 60 Only when social utility
or force majeure makes it necessary are workers obliged to per-
form overtime work.26 ' Workers cannot be required to work more
than four overtime hours on two consecutive days, nor to do
double time on more than two shifts per week. A worker cannot be
required to do more than 160 hours of overtime annually.62
By contrast, the monthly work tour of workers in the interna-
tional tourism system may be as long as 280 hours (about 64 hours
per week),26 3 and for certain workers, the monthly work tour may
be as long as 312 hours (72 hours per week).2 6' This is 47% to 64%
above the national norm of 44 hours per week.2 16  Though regula-
tion No. 15/90 is vague on the requirements of overtime pay, the
presumption is that covered workers will be compensated ade-
quately for their additional hours.
D. Promotion and Training
Article 34 of the Cuban Labor Code allows employers to hire
new workers on a probationary period not exceeding thirty days,
though the probationary period can be extended for another thirty
days when the occupation is skilled or semi-skilled. Probationary
periods as long as 180 days do exist, but only in exceptional
260. Overtime is work that is performed beyond the normal work day or work week,
and undertaken at the request of management. The normal work tour in Cuba is 8 hours per
day and an average of 44 hours per week. CUBAN LABOR ConE, supra note 228, art. 67. For
cyclical or seasonal activities, however, a government administrative agency, with approval
by the workers' organization, may extend the length of the work day and of the work week.
Id. art. 68.
261. Overtime may be necessary when: 1) the work is essential to the national defense;
2) there is a public emergency or industrial accident; 3) there is an urgent need to avoid
shutting down the production of goods or services; 4) double shifts are necessary to compen-
sate for workers who are absent without excuse in an occupation where it has been deter-
mined through the collective bargaining process that the work cannot be interrupted; and 5)
seasonal work must be completed within a specified time period and it is not possible to hire
other workers to perform the work. Id. art. 76.
262. Id. art. 77. A worker may receive payment for overtime in the form of cash or
compensation by time off.
263. Resolution No. 15/90, supra note 160, art. 31.
264. Id. art. 77.
265. See Prez-Lapez, supra note 259, at 205 (estimating the national work norm at 190
hours per month, based on a 44-hour workweek).
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circumstances.2 66
Within the international tourism system, the law provides
greater flexibility to employers. Decree No. 122 establishes a 180-
day probationary period for all new workers regardless of the skill
level associated with their jobs. Thus, the probationary period for
workers of the international tourism system, while technically
within the parameters set by the Cuban Labor Code, is longer than
that of nearly all other Cuban workers. This allows management in
tourism enterprises to screen new workers carefully before con-
verting them to permanent employees.
On the issue of training, the Cuban Labor Code is very vague.
Article 12 requires management to provide general and on-the-job
training for new workers, and article 226 requires management to
provide technical training for workers "so as to give them the theo-
retical and practical knowledge necessary to adequately carry out a
given occupation, meeting the needs of national development and
in harmony with the workers' rights to their personal
improvement.
2 67
In contrast, the special regime for the international tourism
industry is quite specific on training, particularly on the require-
ments of foreign language training. Management in each enterprise
must develop a foreign language training plan for all workers who
require such skills.26 ' Workers who fail to achieve the required for-
eign language skills will be shifted to other positions within the
international tourism system. However, if such reassignment is not
possible, the employer may dismiss the worker.
E. Discipline
Generally, the Cuban Labor Code provides management with
two tools to motivate workers to perform their duties: 1) a reward
266. See, e.g., GUILLN LANDRIAN, supra note 228, at 26 (stating that the probationary
period is up to 120 days for workers in scientific-technical research and that for seamen, the
probationary period could be the length of the first voyage).
. 267. Management, in collaboration with labor organizations, is obliged to: 1) train its
workers in accordance with the needs of its annual programs and development prospects; 2)
include activities related to training in its technical and economic programs; 3) organize
courses in those areas specified by law; 4) provide the material conditions for study that are
necessary for the courses; and 5) promote the improvement of the workers' cultural and
technical knowledge. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 227.
268. Of course, management and labor jointly decide which positions require foreign
language skill.
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system to reinforce exemplary performance; and 2) a disciplinary
system to punish poor performance. 6 9
To provide workers with incentives to excel, management can
reward workers for outstanding work performance, socialist emula-
tion, increased productivity, increased quality of goods and ser-
vices produced, and conservation of raw materials.2 70 Though the
Cuban Labor Code encourages management to reward workers
with moral and material awards, such as publicly recognizing work-
ers' contributions and providing access to scarce goods and ser-
vices, 71 the special tourism labor regime makes no such provisions
for rewarding workers-other than through remuneration.
The Cuban Labor Code imposes the following duties on Cuban
workers:" 2
1) to be regular and punctual in attending work;
2) to make the fullest use of the working day;
3) to fulfill the requirements of their occupation, the col-
lective bargaining agreement, and the disciplinary code;
4) to abide by occupational safety and health regulations;
5) to take proper care of socialist property; and
6) to perform other duties as required by law. 73
The lack of worker discipline is a major problem in Cuba's ef-
forts to overcome its current economic crisis. To help Cuba deal
with this problem, the Fourth Congress of the Cuban Communist
Party passed the following resolution in October 1991:
Under current conditions, it is of decisive importance to con-
front squarely and with resolve the lack of labor discipline. Such
lack of discipline manifests itself in absenteeism, poor use of the
work shift, and the violation of the many rules regarding the
269. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 148.
270. Id. art. 152.
271. Id. art. 153.
272. Id. art. 151.
273. The Cuban Labor Code defines the following as violations of work discipline: 1)
non-observance of work hours; 2) absence from work without good cause; 3) disrespect to-
ward superiors, fellow workers, or third parties during work hours; 4) disobedience; 5) mis-
treatment, by word or deed, of superiors, fellow workers, or third parties, in the workplace
or during work hours; 6) negligence; 7) violation of state secrecy laws; 8) damage to property
of the employer; 9) loss, theft, embezzlement, or fraudulent appropriation of goods or assets
belonging to the workplace or to third parties; 10) conduct that might constitute a misde-
meanor while at work; 11) lack of observance of disciplinary regulations in force in the em-
ploying body; and 12) failure, without good cause, to perform the duties required by occupa-
tional safety and health regulations. Id. art. 158.
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production of goods and services. These deficiencies are reflected
• . . in the misuse of material and human resources, rises in
costs, the very low level . . . of scientific and technical innova-
tions, the decline in labor productivity, corruption, and other ec-
onomic crimes.2 74
The regime established by the CETSS for the international
tourism industry is much more explicit than the Cuban Labor
Code regarding worker discipline. While the Cuban Labor Code
lists twelve general areas of prohibited behavior,
275 Resolution No.
14/90 identifies ten types of forbidden conduct unique to the tour-
ism industry. They include: failure to turn into management publi-
cations left behind by foreign tourists, failure to exchange at the
official rate any foreign currency received as gratuities, failure to
maintain a neat and orderly appearance, and failure to restrict
consumption of food and smoking to designated areas.
27
Resolution No. 14/90 also expressly prohibits tourism workers
from engaging in specific types of conduct.2" In addition to being
lengthy, the list is quite subjective and intrusive. Examples in-
clude: engaging in behavior inside or outside of work that "might
tarnish the exemplary moral and social image of international
tourism workers"; being a source of annoyance to tourists; engag-
ing in arguments with co-workers; and criticizing national tourism
enterprises or any government agency in the presence of tourists."'
Article 160 of the Cuban Labor Code empowers management
to discipline workers so long as management follows certain proce-
dural standards. For minor disciplinary violations
79 management
must take action within sixty days of learning of the offense. In
instances involving negligence, destruction of socialist property, or
criminal behavior,"' management must take disciplinary actions
within thirty days.28 ' Regulation No. 14/90, however, requires man-
agers in the international tourism industry to take disciplinary ac-
tion within thirty days, regardless of the nature or severity of the
violation." 2
274. Resoluci6n sobre el desarrollo econ6mico del pais, supra note 1, at 3.
275. See supra note 273.
276. Resolution No. 14/90, supra note 161, art. 5.
277. Id. art. 6.
278. Id.
279. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 158 (violations 1-5, 12).
280. Id.(violations 6-11).
281. In these instances, criminal proceedings may also be undertaken. Id. art. 169.
282. Resolution No. 14/90, supra note 161, art. 10.
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The Cuban Labor Code also governs temporary and perma-
nent transfers of workers from one position to another. Once a
worker completes the probationary period, management cannot
permanently transfer the worker to another position without the
worker's consent.8 3 Management, however, may make a temporary
transfer provided it does not exceed sixty days and even then only
in emergency situations where the transfer is necessary to avoid
disruptions of work and economic dislocations .2 " Reasons for in-
voluntary transfers include plant shutdowns, economic restructur-
ing, partial worker disability, disciplinary problems, and down-
grading of worker skills.
When management investigates employees for disciplinary
problems, the Cuban Labor Code permits the workers to retain
their current positions until the investigation is complete.289 How-
ever, there are exceptions to this rule: workers in the judicial sys-
tem, teaching profession, research science industry, and railroad
system are suspended until the investigation is complete. 88 Regu-
lation No. 14/90 adds the international tourism system to the
above exceptions, permitting management to suspend workers
without pay or to temporarily transfer them for up to thirty days
during the course of an investigation.8 7
The Cuban Labor Code also outlines procedures for disciplin-
ing workers. The Cuban Labor Code provides that management
must inform employees, in writing, of any alleged violation for
which discipline is required.2 88 Disciplinary measures become effec-
tive on the first working day after such written notice289 and re-
main in force until a court confirms, modifies, or revokes the
measures.
290
Workers may appeal disciplinary actions to a municipal peo-
ple's court2 '91 within ten days of receiving written notification.
2 92
283. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 41.
284. Id. art. 42.
285. Id. art. 170.
286. Id. arts. 191-192.
287. Resolution No. 14/90, supra note 161, art. 14.
288. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 160.
289. Id. art. 166.
290. Id. art. 168.
291. Garcia C~rdenas writes:
The municipal people's courts are composed of the presidents of individual
courts and the other judges, who are chosen and are subject to recall by the
municipal assemblies of People's Power, to which these courts must make peri-
odic reports. Their functions are: to try cases at the lowest judicial level of
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The court can modify or revoke the disciplinary measure and can
also award monetary damages to the affected worker,
293 though
monetary damages may not exceed the value of the loss in earn-
ings.294 When revoking management's action, the court publicly an-
nounces its decision at an assembly of all workers.2
95 Workers may
appeal a decision of a municipal people's court to the provincial
people's courts, and ultimately to the People's Supreme Court
2 9
Disciplinary measures for workers in the international tourism
system differs substantially from those detailed by the Cuban La-
bor Code, particularly with respect to procedural review. Interna-
tional tourism workers may appeal disciplinary actions directly to
management within ten days of receiving written notice.
297 Man-
agement may consult with the representative commission
29 8 of the
workplace before deciding to ratify, modify, or revoke the original
measure.29 ' Results of this management appeal, however, are not
subject to administrative or judicial review.'00 Regulation No. 14/
90 does allow management to review the incident for up to one
year after implementation of a measure, if there is new evidence
that .vas not available at the time of the- original meaaure or if the
original action was arbitrary or unjust.
3 0 '
F. Rehabilitation and Reinstatement
The Cuban Labor Code provides that rehabilitated workers
may be reinstated to their original positions after the disciplinary
period, provided the worker has not committed additional viola-
tions during the interim." 2 A worker who demonstrates exemplary
conduct may be reinstated before the scheduled end of the discipli-'
nary period."3 Though the Cuban Labor Code is vague regarding
crimes under their jurisdiction; and [to] hear cases at the lowest judicial level
dealing with civil and labor matters under their jurisdiction.
GARCIA CARDENAS, supra note 8, at 93.
292. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 262.
293. Id. art. 182.
294. Id. art. 184.
295. Id. art. 182.
296. GARCIA CARDENAS, supra note 8, at 91-93.
297. Resolution No. 14/90, supra note 161, art. 18.
298. Id. art. 22.
299. Id. art. 23.
300. Id. art. 25.
301. Id. art. 26.
302. CUBAN LABOR CODE, supra note 228, art. 189.
303. Id. art. 190.
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the terms and conditions of rehabilitation, it does provide for issu-
ance of special regulations to deal with the rehabilitation of teach-
ers, railroad workers, and scientific researchers.
3 0 4
The special legal regime for the international tourism system
prescribes specific time periods for the rehabilitation of workers
who are dismissed or transferred out of the international tourism
system without reinstatement rights. Workers who are dismissed
must complete five years of disciplined work outside the industry
before they are eligible for re-employment in the international
tourism system. Those who are transferred must undergo three
years of disciplined work outside of the industry before they are
eligible for reemployment. When workers are disciplined in their
new positions, the disciplinary periods run sequentially, so that the
worker will not be eligible for rehabilitation and potential rein-
statement until both measures have run.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LABOR REGIME FOR INTERNATIONAL
TOURISM WORKERS
Decree 122 became effective on August 13, 1990. Its implemen-
tation has proceeded gradually because the various enterprises in
the international tourism industry have been slow to establish
"representative commissions," and in turn, the commissions have
been slow to evaluate the suitability and aptitude of the workers.
A. Suitability and Aptitude
In December 1990, INTUR and the Cuban tourism enterprise
Cubanac~n30 5 released the evaluation data of twenty tourism work
centers collectively employing over 2,200 workers.306 Of these work-
ers, the representative commissions found that 4.7% were not suit-
able and 12.5% were not apt. Thus, 17.2% of the workers were
subject to removal from the international tourism industry. Those
found not suitable were to be removed from the international tour-
ism system after receiving two months of wages as severance pay.
Those found not apt were to be transferred from their current po-
sitions to other positions within the international tourism industry
304. Id. arts. 191-192.
305. See supra note 3.
306. Aplicadas en 20 centros de turismo las nuevas regulaciones laborales,
TtABAJADORES, Dec. 8, 1990, at 4.
1992]
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
or to jobs outside the industry.
A more current report on the implementation of Decree No.
122 covered 447 tourism centers under the control of INTUR.
3 0 7 Of
the nearly 19,500 workers in these enterprises, 11.3% were subject
to removal: 3.5% not suitable; 7.8% not apt. Interestingly, how-
ever, 65.1% of the suitable workers were nevertheless "deficient"
in some areas, and the commissions issued deadlines for correcting
these deficiencies. Unfortunately, no information was provided on
the nature of these deficiencies (i.e. whether they were personal or
work related).
A review conducted at the Riviera Hotel between October
1990 and March 1991 resulted in the dismissal or transfer of 30
workers who were not suitable. A press account of the review
states:vso
[The General Manager] says this is the first step in something
that should be systematized in order to continue reducing the
level of absenteeism and achieve fast and enthusiastic service, in
short, to eliminate vices and achieve discipline in the hotel sec-
tor. A change is already noticeable: You don't see people con-
stantly sauntering in the hallways chatting, an indication that
many people are neglecting their duties. It is as though there
has been an inoculation against tolerance.
Another positive result of this new mechanism is that it is
possible for management to impose disciplinary measures with-
out having to depend on bureaucratic red tape which sometimes
caused delays of months. They can even propose the dismissal of
undisciplined or lazy workers.
Strict disciplinary rules, coupled with streamlined procedures
for their enforcement and a severe set of penalties-including dis-
missal-are attractive to foreign investors. The manager of the Sol-
Palmeras hotel, a 50-50 joint venture between the Spanish hotel
chain Sol-Melid and Cubanacdn, described his experience with the
Cuban workforce as follows:
They are intelligent people who are very willing to work and im-
prove, with a strong desire to do things well. It bears noting that
some have fallen by the wayside. Either because they could not
stand the pace of work, because they did not adapt to the com-
307. Positivos primeros resultados de la idoneidad en el turismo, TRABAJADORES, June
3, 1991, at 3.
308. Standards for Tourism Workers Discussed, FBIS-LAT, May 10, 1991, at 4.
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pany's system, or because they preferred to change jobs. Or else
because they had to be removed for breaking our rules. But this
is a minority, and they have never left on a whim, because of an
injustice, or on their own. The reason has actually been a viola-
tion of our own rules and Cuban laws, which means dismissal
from the hotel. When such decisions have been necessary, we
have consulted at length with all of the [interested parties], in-
cluding the union . . . and the Base Committee of the UJC
[Union of Communist Youth]. [A worker who has been dis-
missed] can go to the Cubanacdn agency that sends us person-
nel. [The worker] can even appeal. But since we make our deci-
sion by consensus, [the worker] will never be returning to the
hotel. The principle of having suitable staff is observed here
from the beginning and must be respected for the sake of qual-
ity service.30
Regarding the grounds for dismissing workers, the manager offered
the following information: "There are things that cannot be ig-
nored. Theft is not forgiven. We do not talk things over with a
thief. We also monitor attendance and punctuality, and someone
can also be dismissed for poor work, but always after trying to cor-
rect the problem."3 '
B. Size of the Work force
Overstaffing of tourism facilities concerns Cuban officials.
However, this concern is not limited to the tourism industry, or to
Cuba. It applies to all socialist economies that make full employ-
ment-without regard to productivity-a national priority."'
At the May 1990 inauguration of a hotel built as a 50-50 joint
venture with foreign investors, President Castro compared the 50-
50 facility with a 100% Cuban-owned hotel:
[After reviewing] the staff, I can say that our hotel, with almost
half as many rooms. . . has more workers than this hotel. And
our comrades surely think they have [improved the quality of
their service]. They have made an extraordinary effort. And how
happy I was to be able to show with numbers and facts that we
really have a lot to learn to become truly efficient. Efficiency is
the best service with the fewest workers. . . . [T]he number [of
309. Sol-Palmeras Manager on Hotel Operations, supra note 4, at 5, 7.
310. Id.
311. On Cuban employment issues, including the relationship between employment and
productivity, see CARMELO MESA-LAGo, THE ECONOMY OF SOCIALIST CUBA (1981).
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workers in the Cuban hotel] will be reduced in the future. Let us
see how we can begin to gain an advantage. . . . [The ratio of]
the number of workers [to] the number of rooms is a very im-
portant indicator [of efficiency]. 2
Decree 122 and its attendant regulations have decreased the
size of the workforce in international tourism facilities and hence,
have improved efficiency. For example, based on the results of the
suitability and aptitude evaluation in December 1990, twenty IN-
TUR and Cubanacdn enterprises reduced their total workforce
from 2204 to 1953 workers (11.4%).s"' In another report the gov-
ernment indicated that an evaluation of nineteen INTUR facilities
resulted in a 9.6% reduction in the workforce, an increase in job
flexibility, a 15% increase in hard currency earnings, and a 100%
increase in hard currency generated from tips received by the
workers.3 1"
C. Characteristics of Tourism Workers
Another effect of the special labor regime for tourism workers
is the "creaming" of the labor force. Tourism joint ventures are a
magnet for university graduates and other workers who want to get
ahead. The tourism industry offers many advantages including:
better remuneration than otherwise available to workers; the op-
portunity to have contact with foreigners; the opportunity to earn
tips in hard currency; and access to goods only available in stores
for tourists. The attraction of the tourism industry is so strong
that it also affects the workforce in other industries. For example,
a paper factory in Cfrdenas experienced very high labor turnover
in 1990 because the employees were leaving to work in nearby
tourism facilities in Varadero Beach.351 To counteract the outflow
of workers, the paper factory implemented a number of measures
including: increasing wages, introducing shift work and moral in-
centives; remodelling the dining room; improving health facilities;
and adding more recreational activities. 16
312. PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO, supra note 124, at 5.
313. Aplicadas en 20 centros de turismo las nuevas regulaciones laborales, supra note
306, at 4.
314. Positivos primeros resultados de la idoneidad en el turismo, supra note 307, at 3.
315. As one commentator noted: "The powerful Varadero tourism program offers
tempting opportunities, including higher wages and better working and living conditions."
Rebecca Antunez, Tourist Jobs Affecting Factory Workers, FBIS-LAT, May 17, 1990, at 6.
316. Id.
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Another observer has noted the emergence of a well-educated
"workers' aristocracy" in tourism joint ventures. 1 Cuba's educa-
tional policies, with their heavy emphasis on professional and tech-
nical training, have been for many years out of step with the econ-
omy's demand for labor.318 This mismatch between labor supply
and the economy's demand has adversely affected the economy.
"The contradiction is obvious. How can production processes be
developed, in any social system, with a disproportionately larger
number of professionals and technicians than workers, especially in
an underdeveloped economy like [Cuba]?"31 The special labor re-
gime for tourism workers seems to worsen this mismatch by taking
workers away from other production processes.
VII. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
One of the weaknesses of Decree No. 50, passed in 1982 for the
active creation of joint ventures with foreign investors, is its lack of
clarity and specificity in many areas that are critical to investors.
Foreign investors are simply not willing to make sizable invest-
ments where issues, such as management, the ability to generate
profits, the repatriation of profits, and the security of investments,
are murky or left to the discretion of the host government. Recog-
nizing that these weaknesses discourage foreign investment in the
island's international tourism industry, Cuba has taken steps to
correct them. For example, the government made changes to its
constitution in 1992 to clarify the concept of private property.2 0
An important part of Cuba's aggressive campaign to attract
foreign investment is the promotion of tourism as an economically
attractive industry. Decree No. 50 singled out joint ventures in the
tourism industry for special treatment, including exemptions from
taxes, more favorable regulations regarding labor, public order, and
immigration controls, and the ability to lease Cuban installations
and hire workers directly. The State Finance Committee also pro-
claimed a system of accelerated depreciation allowances so that
these investors could achieve higher rates of return on their
317. OPPENHEIMER, supra note 56, at 293.
318. See, e.g., Sergio Diaz-Briquets, Collision Course: Labor Force and Educational
Trends in Cuba, 23 CUBAN STUD. (forthcoming Nov. 1993).
319. Georgina Jim~nez, Need for University Graduates Questioned, FBIS-LAT, July 5,
1991, at 6, 7.
320. See CUBAN CONST. art. 14, reprinted in GRANMA, Sept. 22, 1992, at 3, 5; see also




Employers in the tourism industry enjoy more favorable labor
regulations than those in other Cuban industries. Cuba enacted
this special labor regime to promote excellence in the provision of
tourism services. The regulations screen unsuitable workers from
its workforce and reward employees with outstanding work
records. These regulations reflect the importance of high quality
service in the tourism area.
Generally, the special labor regime provides higher levels of
compensation than those available to other workers. Unlike other
Cuban workers, who are subject to the general provisions of the
1984 Labor Code, workers in the international tourism industry
face longer probationary periods, have less job security, work
longer hours, are more likely to work irregular schedules, and may
be required to complete training in foreign languages as a condi-
tion for obtaining or maintaining employment. Thus, while the
special labor regime imposes greater duties, it also provides for ad-
ditional compensation.
The most significant differences between the Cuban Labor
Code and the special labor regime concern discipline and the pro-
cedures for challenging disciplinary actions. The special regime is
more restrictive than the Cuban Labor Code on both counts: the
special regime specifies a greater number of actions that result in
disciplinary measures, shortens the time periods for challenging
the disciplinary decisions, and eliminates appeals through the
usual judicial and administrative channels.
The labor regime governing international tourism workers is
especially strict when compared to Cuba's general labor code. This
is significant in light of the fact that C6rdova, an authority on la-
bor codes and labor-management relations in Latin America, has
described the 1984 Cuban Labor Code as "lean" in terms of worker
protections and given to a "disciplinary bend."32'
Confirming the emphasis on discipline, Rafael Sed, Cuba's
Minister of Tourism, described the special labor regime as "tough
new regulations [that make clear] only trained workers will get ho-
tel jobs, and those whose service is poor will be fired, a practice
321. C6RDOVA, supra note 229, at 45-51. C6rdova noted that 65 of the 308 Code's arti-
cles (21%) deal with the duties of workers, minimum work norms, work discipline and vol-
untary work. Id.
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avoided in other areas of the economy."322
The special legal regime for workers in the international tour-
ism industry also places heavy emphasis on the issue of suitability,
an ill-defined concept that seems to relate mostly to personal qual-
ities and behavior both on and off the job site. Given that lack of
suitability is sufficient reason for dismissal or reassignment and
given that the procedures for contesting such decisions are not
meaningful, job security of workers in the international tourism in-
dustry is undermined.
Despite the political and economic changes that have occurred
in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Cuba clings to
socialism and its centrally planned economy. Because of the coun-
try's deep recession, the Cuban government has made minor con-
cessions to reform the economy, primarily through the promotion
of joint ventures in the international tourism industry. Neverthe-
less, the strategy of permitting tourism joint ventures to operate
under different rules-islands of capitalism within an ocean of so-
cialism-is problematic and will not turn the economy around un-
less it is accompanied by a significant movement toward a market
economy.
322. Julia Preston, Cuba Tests the Water for Tourism, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1988, at
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